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Note
Adultery, Law, and the State: A History
If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology .... It is
perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological document.*
Our legal system is to a large extent the product of the reaction of
authority to the seeking of private vengeance by wronged parties. To
ensure social control, the state must assert a monopoly of force, prohibiting its use by any other than itself.1 This monopoly of force is achieved
through law. Law, by making the use of force a monopoly of the community, pacifies the community. 2 A monopolization of violence is
achieved by the gradual institutionalization of vengeance through law.
"Institutionalization of vengeance" refers to the process by which violent
revenge comes to be exercised lawfully only by the state or under its
authority; in other words, violent revenge becomes part of the law by
being exercised only at the behest of the state.
Traditionally, such legal theorists as Maine and Holmes have seen
the state's institutionalization of the personal desire for vengeance as an
important ingredient in the development of the law.3 The husband
whose wife is murdered might want to kill the killer. The state exercises
the husband's vengeance by itself killing the killer and prohibiting the
husband from doing so. Thus, the state institutionalizes vengeance,
makes it part of the system, by co-opting it. Maine's discussion of the
4
Roman law of theft is a classic example of this co-optation.
This Note argues that the state can institutionalize vengeance by
permission as well as by co-optation. Such permission may be deliber*

O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science andScience in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

210, 212 (1920).
1. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 21 (1945).
2. Id. "[T]he societies of man have from the outset wrestled with the problem of maintaining internal peace and harmony." E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 329 (1954).
3. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 2 (1881) ("It is commonly known that the early
forms of legal procedure were grounded in vengeance."); G. SAWER, LAW IN SOCIETY 40
(1965) ("Putting aside reciprocity, religion, and sorcery, the constant sanctioning force in
primitive society is that of self-help, gradually contained and institutionalized by social action."); W. SEAGLE, QUEST FOR LAW 229 (1941) ("Indeed, public punishment is still only a
thinly disguised system of state vengeance . . .
4. See infra section I.B.
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ately granted, or the state may tolerate private revenge because other
deficiencies in the law make it necessary. If someone slept with another
man's wife, the betrayed husband might want to kill him. But the state
rarely punished adultery with death, and so did not effectively co-opt the
cuckold's vengeance. In some circumstances, although the state would
not kill the interloper, it would allow the husband to kill him. This is
institutionalization of vengeance by permission.
In the case of adultery, permissive remedies have existed side-byside with co-optive remedies provided by the state. To illustrate institutionalization of vengeance by both permission and co-optation, this Note
presents the history of how the law has dealt with the seeking of revenge
against an interloper by one who has discovered his wife in adultery.
In Section I, this Note presents a theoretical model of how the process of legal development has institutionalized vengeance. It discusses the
Roman law of theft, which is the traditional model of legal development
through co-optation of vengeance. The remainder of the Note presents
adultery as a counter-example to show the institutionalization of vengeance by the state through both co-optation and permission.
Section II presents the history of the earliest remedies available in
English law to the cuckolded husband, commenting upon their relative
co-optive or permissive elements and goals. It first discusses remedies
existing at the time of Caesar's invasion of Britain in 44 B.C., then focuses on the earliest known English laws, the sixth-century King
Aethelberht's Code of Dooms, and ends with the codes of native English
law that existed shortly after the Norman Conquest. Section III sets
forth the history of the development of the cuckold's remedies at early
common law. Section IV presents the development of the modem common-law actions, which completely replaced the earlier common-law
actions.
The Note then explores the product of a law that has institutionalized vengeance through both co-optation and permission by considering
the two branches of remedial action available to the cuckold. First, Section V discusses "modem" civil, equitable, and criminal remedies, which
are today in a sort of twilight existence, still in the textbooks, but rarely
used since the 1930s. These are presented as the available co-optive remedies. Finally, the permissive remedies are discussed under the rubric of
the "unwritten law." Here the husband is permitted to kill the marital
interloper. The Note discusses the now-repealed Georgia and Texas statutes that justified the homicide by a husband of one he found in adultery
with his wife. The notorious sympathy of juries for such defendants is
also discussed.
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I. A Theoretical Outline of Legal Development Through the
Institutionalization of Vengeance
A. A Model of Development
This section sets forth a theoretical model of how law has institutionalized vengeance to facilitate the reader's understanding of how English law developed. 5 This model extends beyond the development of the
common law in England-in fact, it refers to societies still in the process
of development. England is simply one of many societies whose development comports with this model.
In barbarian times, wrongful acts such as homicide and adultery
were considered private wrongs against the victim and his kinship
group. 6 A kinship group is a very extended family-a sub-unit of a
tribe. 7 The remedy for a private wrong at this early time was for the
victim or a member of his kinship group to extract "blood-vengeance" by
killing a member of the wrongdoer's kinship group.8 A series of mutual
retributions became a feud between kinship groups, called the bloodfeud, or vendetta. The blood-feud was and still is extremely widespread
in primitive societies. However, because vendetta was a fight between kinship groups, no revenge was taken for a wrong committed within a kinship group, even for homicide. 9
This system of collective responsibility acted as a reasonable deterrent to wrongful conduct because a potential wrongdoer knew that his
5. For a discussion of the legal theory in the introduction and in this section, see A.S.
DIAMOND, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND ORDER (1951); O.W. HOLMES, supra note 3, Lec-

tures I-I; H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW ch. X (F. Pollock ed. 1884); W. SEAGLE, supra note 3;
see also Pound, IndividualInterests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 177-81
(1916). See generally E. Ross, SOCIAL CONTROL chs. V, VIII-IX (1910) for an interesting
combination of crude psychological theories, Nietzsche, racism, and progressivism that produces an optimistic theory. For an introduction to, and bibliography of, historical and anthropological approaches to jurisprudence, see R. DIAS, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE ch.
18 (3d ed. 1979); D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE ch. 9 (4th ed. 1979); S.
ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1979).

The best general discussion of primitive law is E. HOEBEL, supra note 2. Hoebel traces "the
trend of the law" by presenting a string of contemporary societies at various stages of legal
development. Id. ch. 12.
6. "In modem society murder is the major crime against the individual, but primitive
peoples treated it as a private, amendable wrong. Obviously they had no conception of
'crime.'" W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 29.
7. See R. LOWIE, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY chs. VI-VII (1920).
8.

"Authority to enforce a norm resides (for private wrongs) with the wronged individ-

ual and his immediate kinsmen-but only for the duration of time necessary to follow through
the procedural steps that lead to redress or punishment of the culprit." E. HOEBEL, supra note
2, at 276.
9. W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 38. See id. chs. III-IV for a discussion of the blood feud.
For a fictional account of the blood feud in the United States, see MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN ch. XVIII (W. Blair & V. Fischer ed. 1985) (The
Grangerford-Shepherdson Feud).
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act might bring retribution not only against himself, but against his relations as well. 10 As the blood-feud developed into a sophisticated social
institution, one act of retaliation became sufficient. Furthermore, the kin
of the wronged man became socially obligated to extract bloodvengeance.11
In some societies, the potential arbitrariness of the blood-feud was
checked by the development of a regulated fight or public humiliation of
the wrongdoer. In cases of wrongs less than homicide, such as theft or
adultery, these alternatives would satisfy the victim and his kin. 12 The
kin were angry and demanded satisfaction, and the offender feared being
handed over by his group to avoid feud or disorder. A peaceful solution
was reached when the offender voluntarily submitted himself to a throw13
ing of spears, a hacking with knives, or some other regulated fight.
Composition, the most flourishing institution of primitive and later
archaic law, can be seen in embryo in this public humiliation. Composition was a voluntary offering by the wrongdoer and his kinship group
made in the hope of averting a blood-feud, and it was also a form of
humiliation for the offender and his kin. The humiliation appeased the
wronged kinship group's thirst for revenge. Acceptance was optional for
the kin of the wronged party, who retained the right to insist on violent
revenge. 14
This primitive institution of composition must be distinguished from
modern notions of damages. "In damages the idea of compensation for
the actual loss is dominant, but in composition the motive is rather the
awarding of an amount which shall be sufficiently large to induce the
relatives to keep the peace." 15 The state often came to facilitate composition by providing sophisticated tables of tariffs for each particular
wrong. 16 These tables avoided the difficulties involved in settling upon
an amount and thus preserved domestic order.
Composition became possible with the accumulation of surplus
wealth. 17 It spread because the kinship group was willing to accept restitution and the wrongdoer feared violent retribution.1 8 Eventually the
state became strong enough to-and desired to-make the system of
10.
11.

W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 44.
"[W]hen the community qua community acknowledges the exercise of force by a

wronged person or his kinship group as correct and proper in a given situation, and so restrains the wrongdoer from striking back, then law prevails and order triumphs over violence."
E. HOEBEL, supra note 2, at 276.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 41.
A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 22.
W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 41.
Id. at 42; see H. MAINE, supra note 5, at 365.
W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 41.
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composition compulsory. By enforcing composition, the state tried to
end the internal disorder caused by blood-feuding. 19 However, as surplus
wealth increased, composition became a mere20fine for rich transgressors
and therefore became an undesirable system.
The system of composition eventually was completely suppressed by
the expansion of the "king's peace,"'2 1 which was the king's assertion that
a violent act, a breach of the peace, was a wrong to him. 22 The growth of
strong government gave the king a special interest in preserving peace
and preventing homicides and personal injuries, apart from the interests
of his individual subjects. What was formerly a private wrong exclusively
against an individual came to be seen as a public wrong against the do23
mestic order and therefore against the state.
As the concept of the "king's peace" expanded, the king increasingly insisted upon an exclusive right to punish wrongs. 24 A system of
private settlement between the respective kin of the perpetrator and the
victim such as composition could not coexist with the king's exclusive
right and therefore was suppressed.2 5 The homicides and more serious
personal injuries ceased to be emendable by composition and were prosecuted as crimes, usually with the death penalty.2 6 Moreover, the range of
breaches of the peace in which the king displayed a special interest gradually expanded into offenses less serious than homicide and treason. This
gradual assertion of jurisdiction, after overcoming resistance, converted
what we would call "torts" into what we would call "crimes." By insisting on its exclusive right to punish wrongs, the state asserted a monopoly
of violence.
Revenge was the original goal of the displaced system of composition, 27 and the state achieved popular acceptance of its monopoly of violence by institutionalizing revenge. It could do this either by co-optation,
that is, infficting the vengeance of the wronged party or his kin upon the
disturber of public order, or by permission, that is, allowing the wronged
party to take revenge himself, under the tacit authority of the state.
With respect to adultery in England, the state failed to co-opt the
19.
political
20.
21.
22.
23.

"[S]uppression of the feud becomes ever more determined with the consolidation of
power." Id. at 68.
Id. at 42, 68-69.
See id. ch. VII.
Id. at 70-73.
G. SAWER, supra note 3, at 64; see also O.W. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 39; E. Ross,

supra note 5, at 39-40; W.
24.

SEAGLE,

supra note 3, at 228-30.

"The really significant shift ...

in the development of primitive law is [that] ...

[p]rivilege-rights and responsibility for the maintenance of the legal norms are transferred
from the individual and his kinship group to the agents of the body politic as a social entity."
E. HOEBEL, supra note 2, at 329.
25.
26.
27.

W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 73-75.
G. SAWER, supra note 3, at 64.
W. SEAGLE, supra note 3, at 39-42.
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vengeance of the wronged husband completely, and institutionalized his
violence by a partial and ineffective co-optation that coexisted with permission for the private exercise of violence in limited circumstances. In
contrast to this ineffective co-optation of vengeance for adultery in England, the ancient Roman law was openly designed to effectively co-opt
the victim's vengeance. The following section explores the Roman law of
theft as an example of explicit state co-optation.
B. The Roman Law of Theft: An Example of Co-optation of Revenge
by the State
Sir Henry Maine, the great pioneer of historical jurisprudence, 28 was
a leading exponent of the theory that the state co-opted vengeance in the
development of its criminal law. 29 To illustrate this theory, Maine used
the dual classification of thieves in the Roman law of theft as his primary
30
example.
Maine stated that "the earliest administrators of justice simulated
the probable acts of parties engaged in a private quarrel [and] took as
their guide the measure of vengeance likely to be exacted by an aggrieved person under the circumstances of the case."'3 1 That is, the state
co-opted the victim's vengeance by inflicting it itself. He wrote:
The Laws of the Twelve Tables seem to have divided Thefts into Manifest and Non-Manifest, and to have allotted extraordinarily different
penalties to the offense according as it fell under one head or the other.
The Manifest Thief was he who was caught within the house in which
he had been pilfering, or who was taken while making off to a place of
safety with the stolen goods; the Twelve Tables condemned him to be
put to death if he were already a slave, and, if he was a freeman, they
28. See M.E. DUFF, MAINE: A BRIEF MEMOIR OF His LIFE (1892); G. FEAVER, FROM
STATUS TO CONTRACT (1969); P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 86-115

(1980); see also C.

CRAWLEY, TRINITY HALL 86-87, 113, 146-52, plate 10 (1976) (Maine as
Master of Trinity Hall).
29. This theory was further developed by Holmes. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 3, Lectures
I-II.
30. H. MAINE, supra note 5, at 365. Holmes used the common-law rules of deodand and
animals. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 20-38. For the distinction between the Manifest and
Non-Manifest Thief, see W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 319-20

(1925); W.

BUCKLAND,

JoLowIcz

& B.

A

TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW

581-82 (P. Stein 3d ed. 1963); H.

NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW
(3d ed. 1972); A. PRICHARD, LEAGE'S ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 404-06 (3d ed.

167-70, 274-75
1961). For a translated formula, see id. at 478-79. The Roman law of theft has been described
as
one of the least commendable parts of the mature Roman law ... because many
archaic features were allowed to survive .... The archaic survivals are of great
interest to the student of anthropology and primitive law, but are strangely out of
place in a system as sophisticated as the classical Roman law ....

B.

NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW
31. H. MAINE, supra note 5, at 365-66.

211 (1962).
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made him the bondsman of the owner of the property. The Non-Manifest Thief was he who was detected under any other circumstances
than those described; and the old code simply directed that an offender
of this sort should refund double the value of what he had stolen....
The ancient lawgiver [of the Twelve Tables] doubtless considered that
the injured proprietor, if left to himself, would inflict a very different
punishment when his blood was hot from that with which he would be
and
satisfied when the Thief was detected after a considerable interval;
32
to this calculation the legal scale of penalties was adjusted.
Justinian, in his Digest of Roman Law, preserved and further refined
the distinction between the Manifest and Non-Manifest Thief,33 but by
his time-the early sixth century A.D.-it was essentially academic. 34 A
telling archaicism in Justinian's Digest is a citation to Pomponius: "[I]f
you saw me committing a theft in your house, but hid yourself for fear
that I might kill you, even though you watched me, it is not a case of
manifest theft."'3 5 This further supports the thesis that the punishment
was a substitute for vengeance. The thief on whom the homeowner
would not take vengeance was not classified as a Manifest Thief. The
Manifest Thief was one "caught in the very act,"136 in a circumstance in
which the owner of the house, had he caught the thief, would have killed
him. However, if the homeowner showed that he did not want to take
revenge because he lacked the fortitude to do so, the state would not do it
for him.
Maine commented that "the men of primitive times were ...completely ... persuaded that the impulses of the injured person were the
proper measure of the vengeance he was entitled to exact, and ...literally... imitated the probable rise and fall of his passions in fixing their
scale of punishment. ' 37 The Roman law of theft thus is an excellent
example of the institutionalization of vengeance through co-optation.
The following section presents the early history of the English law of
adultery. The Anglo-American law of adultery will serve as an example
of the institutionalization of vengeance through both co-optation and
permission.

II. Early English Law
A.

Before 600 A.D.: A Pre-History and Background
This section describes how and why adultery became a wrong, and

32. Id. at 366-67.
33. DIG. 46.2.2-.9, translated in THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 103-05 (C. Kolbert ed.
1979).
34. "[Its] surviv[al] all through the classical period suggests that the actiofurtimanifesti
was not often brought." B. NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 212.
35. DIG. 46.2.7 (Ulpian).
36. Id. 46.2.3 (Ulpian).
37. H. MAINE, supra note 5, at 368.
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how it was remedied by the early English law. It explains the social institution of bride-price marriage, which is important for an understanding

of the cultural background of early English law. This section also sets the
stage for the consideration of the earliest written compilations of English

law.
1. Adultery and Blood-Feud
Adultery was not a serious wrong before society became monogamous. 38 When Caesar invaded Britain in 55 B.C., his impression was
that the Britons were not monogamous, but rather shared common wives
within a kinship group. 39 If, in fact, they were not then monogamous,
the Britons became monogamous during the invasions of Germanic
tribes, who were certainly monogamous, 4° from the European Continent
in the fourth and fifth centuries.4 ' Once monogamy took hold in Britain,
whether it was before or after Caesar's invasion, society recognized adultery as a serious wrong 42 that invaded a husband's "rights" over his

wife.43

Adultery, considered a private wrong, was remedied by the self-help
of the husband and his kinship group-that is, by vendetta.44 Failure of
38. See J. ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW 45 (1927).
39. All the Britons dye themselves with woad,... wear their hair long, and have
every part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and even twelve
of them have wives in common to them, and particularly brothers among brothers
and parents among their children; but if there be any issue by these wives, they are
reputed to be the children of those by whom respectively each was first espoused
when a virgin.
JULIUS CAESAR, COMMENTARIES bk. V, ch. XIV, reprintedin A. KOCOUREK & J. WIGMORE,
SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 89 (1915). But the Britons may in fact have been
monogamous. Caesar's observations may be inaccurate because he visited England only for a
short time while it was in a state of war against him.
40. See TACITUS, GERMANICA XVIII-XIX (H. Mattingly & S. Hardford trans. 1981)
(published as THE AGRICOLA AND THE GERMANICA).
41. 1 R. HODGKIN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-SAXONS chs. III-VI (3d ed. 1952).
"Having once obtained a glimpse of this glorious land, the hungry, half-naked Teuton was
unable to appease the desire of possessing it." 1 J. ST. JOHN, HISTORY OF THE FOUR CONQUESTS OF ENGLAND 61 (1862). For a unique history of these invasions, see D. HAIGH, THE
CONQUEST OF BRITAIN BY THE SAXONS (1861).

42. Adultery was wrong because it bastardized a family's lifeline, destroyed family unity,
and was a serious blow to a man's pride. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery-A Synopsis, 1 J.
FAM. L. 89, 89 (1961).
43. R. HUEBNER, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW 617 (F. Philbrick trans.
1918). These "rights" of a Germanic tribesman over his wife were at times savage. Huebner
cites "from the Flemish cofitume of Ardenberg the rule that a husband may cut open his wife
and warm his feet in her blood, provided only (that] he sew her up again and that she remain
alive." Id. at 617 n.1 (citing 1 H. BRUNNER, DEUTSCHE RECHTSEGESCHICHTE 101 (2d ed.
1906)). Analogous rights probably existed among the Germanic tribes that invaded England.
44. "[H]omicide, adultery with a wife, and the stealing of a wife (including the capture or
elopement of a bride) commonly rouse fierce passions, and might lead to the murder of the

November 1986]

ADULTERY, LAW, AND THE STATE

the kin to fulfill their solemn duty to take vengeance resulted in dishonor.4 5 Among the Anglo-Saxon tribes, no feuding occurred within the
kinship group, and so adultery
by another within one's kinship group
46
might have gone unremedied.
2.

Bride-PriceMarriage

To place the further development of English law in its cultural con48
text,47 the institution of bride-price marriage must be understood.
Bride-price, or bride-wealth, marriage was the most significant institution in the life of the barbarian. It began as a gift to the bride's father or

next of kin to secure his consent to the marriage. So highly did the woman's father and suitor value her that the bride-wealth gradually grew
into a great mass of property. 49
It is a misconception to regard bride-price marriage as a sale of the
woman.5 0 Bride-price marriage was too fundamental and too much
colored by every aspect of life to be analogized to a moderi commercial
transaction. The Code of Aethelberht used the word "buy," but in context its meaning is much different from our own use of the word 5 1 because of all that bride-price marriage embraced in the minds of these
peoples.5 2 In early medieval England, although bride-wealth changed
offender or his friends by an aggrieved person or his friends, or to fights between the two
kinship or local groups." A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 22.
45. See, eg., THE ICELANDIC LAXDAELIC SAGA 197 (M. Magnusson & H. Polsson trans.
1969); Hieatt, Introduction to BEOWULF AND OTHER OLD ENGLISH POEMS at xviii-xxii (C.
Hieatt trans. 2d ed. 1983).
46. F. SEEBOHM, TRIBAL CUSTOM IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 56-72 (1911) (discussing Beowulf). Perhaps this is the root of Caesar's observation. See supra note 39.
47. "[L]aw divorced from its cultural matrix is meaningless." E. HOEBEL, supra note 2,
at 39.
48. The failure of some writers to understand the institution of bride-price marriage has
led to misinterpretations of the early law as it concerned women. E.g., Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV.651, 655-58 (1930); Murray, supra note 42, passim.
49. The need to accumulate the requisite bride-wealth motivated the suitor's industry. It
helped knit together his family, on whom he depended to provide the cattle. The price he paid
made him value all the more highly the wife who was so difficult to acquire. As for the bride,
the wealth her marriage brought to her family increased her self-respect. Furthermore, the
bride-wealth was her security against ill-treatment, for if she left her husband for good cause
he would not be entitled to return of the property, and he would therefore probably have been
unable to acquire another wife. The receipt by her relations of shares of the bride-wealth put
them under a duty to protect her against ill-treatment, by force if necessary, and in the event of
calamity to support her and her children. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 99-100.
50. Id. at 101.
51. "[W]e must neither blindly nor willfully force upon primitive data that are only relatively comparable the specific content of meaning associated with our terminology." E.
HOEBEL, supra note 2, at 20.
52. See A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 99-100; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 364-65 (2d ed. 1898); cf R. LOWIE, supra note 7, at 201-03 (it is
wrong to judge a society by the apparent status of its women).
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hands before a marriage, women were not "owned" as chattels. A guardian of a marriageable or married woman, however, had certain expectations raised by the institution of bride-price marriage that could be foiled
53
by an adulterous liaison.
Composition, another flourishing institution of early society,
emerged in England prior to the middle of the sixth century.5 4 In the
sixth century, a code was promulgated to provide a fixed scale of sums to
be paid as composition, to serve as a viable alternative to the blood-feud.
This code was known as Aethelberht's Dooms.
B. Aethelberht's Dooms
Aethelberht was the King of Kent, in southeastern England, from
560 or 565 A.D. until his death in 616. 55 He promulgated a set of secular
laws5 6 referred to as the Code of Dooms. 57 It is the oldest surviving
literary document in any Teutonic tongue, and with it the "grand traditions of English law and English literature both commence." 58 Traditionally, it is thought to have been promulgated after Augustine
converted Aethelberht to Christianity in the first few years of the seventh
century,5 9 but it might perhaps come from any year after 565, the date of
60
Aethelberht's accession.
Aethelberht's legislation has been classified with the "Early Codes,"
"the laws of the barbarian peoples of Western Europe." 61 These Early
Codes were promulgated chiefly to diffuse dangerous resentments arising
from private injuries, and thereby to preserve the peace. The main private wrongs were homicide, serious personal injury, wrongful sexual in53.

Law, in

For bride-wealth marriage in Anglo-Saxon law, see Young, The Anglo-Saxon Family
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW

163-78 (1905).

54. For the development of composition in England and the general process by which
Anglo-Saxon legal procedure evolved to both permit and co-opt vengeance, see Laughlin, The
Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure, in ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW 262-305 (1905).
55. H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, LAW AND LEGISLATION FROM AETHELBERHT TO
MAGNA CARTA 1-27, 157 & n.3 (1966). Bede says 560 A.D., and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
565 A.D.
56. A.S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW PAST AND PRESENT 59 (1971).
57. H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, supra note 55, at 1-10. The text of Aethelberht's
Code may be found in F. ATTENBOROUGH, THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 417 (1922). See generally A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, ch. 5; H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES,
supra note 55; Simpson, The Laws of Ethelbert,in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
3-17 (1981). The Dooms codified pre-existing law and added fresh legislation, although the
proportion of each is uncertain. Each clause of the Dooms is a conditional sentence setting
forth the judgment to be given for each wrong described. Thus, the form is typical of that
taken by many laws.
58. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, at 57; see A.S DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 137.
59. Simpson, supra note 57, at 4.
60. H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, supra note 55, at 1-11 (arguing based on the pagan
character of the document)..
61. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, at 55.
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tercourse, and theft. 62 The predominant purpose of the Dooms was to
provide a fixed scale of composition, which could serve as a viable alternative to the blood-feud. 63 They set out a very detailed scheme of payment of b6t, or compensation," for all varieties of wrongdoing, starting
at the top with pulling hair,65 through to serious wounding, 66 and ending
up with broken toenails. 67 Two factors determined the amount of composition: the seriousness of the wrong and the social class of the wronged
party.6 8 The more serious the wrong and the higher the status of the
wronged party, the greater the composition. The rigidity of the penalties
was the very key to the success of the Dooms: the possibility of negotiations might have led to haggling and thence to feuding.
One could have been entitled to composition under the Dooms in
two ways. First, one directly injured would have been entitled to bdt for
the wrong done to him. Second, one could have been wronged by injury
to another under one's mund, or protection. The sum paid in compensation for violating a mund was called mundbyrd, which was paid in addition to any bdt that might have been due to the kinship group of the
69
party directly injured.
Any illicit sex, including adultery, was a serious wrong under the
Dooms. It wronged the woman's husband or kin who had expectations
relating to the bride-price, and it wronged one under whose mund the
woman lived. Several provisions of Aethelberht's Code set out the pecuniary payments to be made to a wronged party
by one who had sex with
70
a woman under the wronged party's mund.
The Dooms further provided for payment by the interloper to the
62.

Id. at 61.

63. Lively debate over whether the purpose behind this alternative was religious or secular has centered on whether the Dooms were promulgated by a pagan or a Christian king.
Richardson and Sayles argue for a pagan king. H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, supra note 55,
at 2-10. Simpson, in contrast, argues that the Dooms are Christian in nature. Simpson, supra
note 57, at 14.
64. The sanctions all were pecuniary, denominated in Kentish golden shillings and silver
sceattas. Twenty sceattas make up a shilling. In Aethelberht's day, the Kentish golden shilling was probably the price of a cow. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, at 56 n.6. Although it
was primitive, seventh-century southeastern England had a money economy. H. RICHARDSON
& G. SAYLES, supra note 55, at 11, 157-69.
65. AETHELBERHT'S DOOMS cap. 33 [hereinafter AETH.J (50 sceattas).
66. Id. cap. 63 (30 shillings).
67. Id. cap. 72 (30 sceattas for a big toenail, 10 sceattas for each of the others).
68. Not only the sanctions, but the very order of the Dooms' clauses show "an extreme
consciousness of distinctions between social classes-a characteristic which it might not seem
fanciful to describe as English." A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, at 58.
69. Id. at 58-59, 68.
70. AETH., supra note 65, caps. 10-11, 14-16. For example, the Dooms provided that "if
a man lies with a maiden belonging to the King, he shall pay 50 shillings compensation." Id.
cap. 10. This is a large amount, equivalent to fifty cows, see supra note 64, and equivalent to
the bdt due for striking off another's foot, AETH., supra note 65, cap. 69, or half of a freeman's

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

husband, who had had to pay a bride-price for his wife, as composition
for adultery. The provision read: "If a freeman lies with [another] freeman's wife, he shall pay [the husband] his wergeld 7 and procure a second wife with his own money, and bring her to the other man's home."' 72
The marital interloper thus had to take the wife, pay a huge fine of 100
shillings, 73 and produce the capital to pay a bride-price. Because
Aethelberht's Code was an alternative to vendetta, the wronged husband
could either accept this composition, or he could try to kill the
interloper. 74
In Aethelberht's Kent, bride-price marriage was still the prevailing
custom. 7 5 The most interesting, and most misunderstood, 76 provisions of
Aethelberht's Code are those that applied against one who took a woman
without paying the bride-price. 77 These provisions are important because
they are the probable antecedents of the common-law actions for abduction. 78 Thus, "[i]f a man forcibly carries off a maiden [he shall pay] 50
shillings to her owner (e am agande), and afterwards buy from the
owner his consent."' 79 The "owner" is the woman's kinsman entitled to
the bride-price.8 0
The wrongful taking of a woman without paying the bride-price was
a serious wrong to her kinsmen, even if she had in fact consented and
eloped.8 1 A large penalty in addition to the bride-price had to be paid.82
If she was returned, fifty shillings was paid, thirty-five as bdt to the injured party, and fifteen to the king as a wfte to buy back the peace broken
wergeld. Id. cap. 21. Wergeld is defined infra at note 71. The mundbyrd is the same as that
for killing a man on the king's premises. AETH., supra note 65, cap. 5.
The importance of status in setting compensation is well illustrated here: compensation
halves with each drop in status of the woman (25 shillings for a slave, 12 shillings for one "of
the third class." Id. cap. 11), and with each drop in status of the one whose mund is violated
(12 shillings for a nobleman's servingmaid, id. cap. 14; 6 shillings for a commoner's servingmaid, id. cap. 16).
71. Wergeld is a value set on a freeman's life. It literally means "man's price." 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 52, at 47.
72. AETH., supra note 65, cap. 31 (author's translation).
73. A freeman's wergeld. Id cap. 21.
74. See Simpson, supra note 57, at 14.
75. See AETH., supra note 65, cap. 77 (enjoining dishonesty in that custom).
76. E.g., Murray, supra note 42, at 98.
77. AETH., supra note 65, caps. 82-84.
78. See infra section III.
79. AETH., supra note 65, cap. 82.
80. The relationship described by the Dooms was not ownership of the woman but rather
enjoyment of certain rights, including receipt of the bride-price, arising from a status relationship between the woman and her kinsmen. It was a profitable protective wardship rather than
ownership of a chattel. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
81. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 52, at 490.
82. "There is no talk of giving her back, but a bdt must be paid and the mund must be
purchased." Id at 365 n.5.
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by the interloper.8 3 If another man was betrothed to the woman, and so
had already paid the bride-price,
twenty shillings were due, and the be84
trothed had his own remedy.
Although it condemned adultery, Aethelberht's Code was concerned with power, not with religion. Providing a viable alternative to
th6 blood feud by setting a precise scale of penalties was a step in the
process of legal development that eventually led to the state's monopolization of violence. In early seventh-century Kent, the state's effort to
institutionalize vengeance was limited to providing a viable alternative to
exacting that vengeance. As the legal system stood at this stage, vengeance could be exacted (permission) or it could be "bought off" at
prices set by the state (co-optation). Thus, with Aethelberht's Code we
have reached the stage at which a husband, having discovered a man in
adultery with his wife, could either kill the man, or receive compensation
assessed to his presumed satisfaction by the Dooms.
C. Subsequent Development of Native English Law
Several codes promulgated by English kings after Aethelberht also
were concerned primarily with providing a detailed tariff for various enumerated offenses. These later native English Codes present a picture of
the deterioration of domestic order and royal authority in Britain resulting from continual foreign invasion. Although Aethelberht's Code of the
late sixth century did not mention vendetta,8 5 the term was mentioned in
the codes of the ninth and tenth centuries in the form of concessions,
allowing its exercise while feebly attempting to regulate it. 6 With the
spread of Christianity in England in the eighth and ninth centuries, adultery became a sin as well as a wrong against the husband. It was not
until the tenth century, however, that this concept noticeably affected the
written laws.
L Alfred's Code
Alfred, King of Wessex in the latter part of the ninth century,
promulgated a series of laws between the years 871 and 893 A.D. 87 In
88
this Code, Alfred collected earlier laws and added a few of his own.
The Code set a tariff typical of the Anglo-Saxon codes. It also provided
penalties for adultery: "If anyone lies with the wife of a man whose wer83.

AETH., supra note 65, cap. 84; see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at

451.
84. AETH., supra note 65, cap. 83.
85.

See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.

86. E.g., ALFRED cap. 42; II

EDMUND. For the text of Edmund's Code, see A. ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY I, at 6-15 (1925).
87. F. ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 57, at 35. For the text of Alfred's Code, see id. at 62-

88. ALFRED Intro. 49, § 9.
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geld is 1200 shillings, he shall pay 120 shillings compensation to the husband; to a husband whose wergeld is 600 shillings, he shall pay 100
shillings compensation; to a commoner he shall pay 40 shillings compensation." 8 9 The penalties thus were closely tied to status. Payment may
have been uncommon; the tone of the document, which was an attempt
to suppress blood-feuding, suggests that vendetta was prevalent.
A further clause presented the earliest English example of explicit
legal permission to the cuckold to exercise his vengeance. It provided:
A man may fight, without becoming liable to vendetta (drwige) if he
finds another with his wedded wife, behind closed doors or under the
same blanket; or [if he finds another man] with his legitimate daughter
(or with his legitimate married sister); or with his mother, if she has
been legally married to his father. 90
This apparently regressive provision 9' reduced to writing a timehonored practice. It was very similar to the Texas statute that will be
discussed in Section VI of this Note. 92 Both provided that a man who
discovered an adulterer in flagrante delicto with his wife legally could
execute him without fear of retribution. It institutionalized the vengeance of the cuckold by explicitly permitting it.
2. The Central Codes
The codes of law typified by those promulgated in England from 900
to 1100 A.D. have been termed the "Central Codes."' 93 At this time,
barbarism was at its close and civilization was beginning. 94 The chief
97
96
"Central" English Codes are those of Edward, 9 5 Aethelstan, Edgar,
Aethelred, 98 and Cnut,9 9 "all of poor quality, largely drawing on earlier
English material, and showing little progress."' 1 They do, however,
show the impact of Christianity: adultery was now a sin and was explicitly prohibited. Bride-price marriage technically had become optional,' 0 '
89. Id. cap. 10.
90. Id. cap. 42, § 7 (author's translation). Literally, drwige means "without war." It
evidently denoted a man who, having committed homicide under the circumstances specified,
was protected from vengeance at the hands of his victim's relatives. F. ATTENBOROUGH,
supra note 57, at 198 n.42.
91. Murray, supra note 42, at 98-99 (stressing similarity to ancient laws).
92. TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1220 (Vernon 1925) (repealed 1973). In Texas, the grounds
for justified homicide were limited to adultery with wives.
93. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, at 70.
94. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 167.
95. F. ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 57, at 114-17.
96. Id. at 126-43.
97. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 86, at 16-19, 24-29.
98. Id. at 52-71.
99. Id. at 174-219.
100. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 56, at 70.
101. II CNUT cap. 74 ("And no woman or maiden shall ever be forced to marry a man
whom she dislikes, nor shall she be given for money, except the suitor desires of his own free
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did not completely disappear until the end of the twelfth
although1 0 it
2
century.
Adultery, along with other illicit unions 10 3 and prostitution, 10 4 was
prohibited by the Central Codes. The penalties for sexual misconduct
were more severe and covered a greater range than before because it now
was seen as a public wrong: sexual misconduct had become a "crime."
The laws of Cnut strictly enforced monogamy, by mutilation if necessary,10 5 and adultery was considered a wrong against monogamy. With
these codes, not only was the husband interested in retribution against
the marital interloper, but so was the state as an enforcer of morality.
The legacy of these codes remained strong into the early twelfth century,
as will be seen in the next section.
D. The Norman Invasion
L

The Native Law of the Late Eleventh Century

Around the time of the Norman invasion in 1066, a husband could
kill an interloper if he found him in bed with his wife. This is illustrated
by two compilations of laws that appeared soon after the Norman
invasion.
Between the years 1090 and 1135 A.D., a compilation of earlier laws
known as the Leis Willelme appeared.10 6 This compilation echoed Alfred's Code 10 7 by allowing a father who found his daughter in adultery 10in8
either his own house or that of his son-in-law to slay the adulterer.
Presumably, this permission also extended to a husband who found his
wife in similar circumstances. 0 9
Another compilation known as the Leges Henrici Primi stated the
laws claimed by its author to be in force at the time of its writing, sometime between the years 1114 and 1118. It drew heavily on the laws of the
Anglo-Saxon kings, most notably those of Cnut. 110 The Leges Henrici
will to give something."). Unquestionably, the Church was behind this. See A.S. DIAMOND,
supra note 5, at 186-87.
102. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 5, at 248.
103. I EDMUND cap. 4 (with nuns); V AETHELRED cap. 10 (illicit unions); VI AETHELRED cap. I1 (same); 1 CNUT cap. 6, § 3 (same); V AETHELRED cap. 25 (violations of marriage); VI AETHELRED cap. 28, § 2 (same); VIII AETHELRED cap. 4 (illicit intercourse); I
CNUT cap. 24 (illicit unions); II CNUT caps. 6, 50, 53-55 (adultery).
104. VI AETHELRED cap. 7; II CNUT cap. 4a.
105. II CNUT cap. 53.
106. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 86, at 227 (dates), 252-75 (text).
107. ALFRED cap. 42, § 7.
108. LEIS WILLELME cap. 35.
109. The source of the law, Alfred's Code, permitted the husband to slay the interloper.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
110. Downer, Leges HenriciPrimi, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOR OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 175, 176-78 (M. Forkosch ed. 1966). Most scholars have accepted the Leges as

a serious contribution, however mangled, to the law of the early twelfth century. Id. at 186.
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Primi also echoed Alfred's Code, allowing a man to fight another man
found with his wife behind closed doors or under one covering."1 '
Much of the Leges Henrici Primi was devoted to controlling bloodfeuds, which were still relatively prevalent, by placating relatives and trying to achieve royal justice. 112 By the end of the eleventh century, the
state was interested in co-opting vengeance, including that which the
husband would desire against the marital interloper. In the Leges Henrici Primi, the king asserted jurisdiction over the disposition of the marital interloper: "If a married man commits adultery, the king or lord
shall have the man, and the bishop the woman, for the purpose of exacting a penalty."'1 13 Presumably, the king only got the man if the cuckold
did not get him first.
Before the reign of Henry I in the early twelfth century, wrongs
were identified both by the damage or loss inflicted and by the affront to
honor that the deed entailed.ll 4 Adultery was a very great wrong when
reckoned by either element, so great in fact that it was the only wrong for
5
which composition had not become obligatory."1
2. Norman Reforms
When Duke William of Normandy conquered England in 1066, the
Normans brought with them "a taste for strong government and a flair
for administration.... The common law emerged in the twelfth century
from the efficient and rapid expansion of institutions which existed in an
undeveloped stage before 1066."116
Norman judicial policy favored a system of precisely measured vengeance exercised at the behest of the state. William I made two main
"reforms" in the criminal law. He introduced the appeal of felony with
its concomitant, trial by battle, and he substituted mutilation for death
111. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 82, 8 [hereinafter L.H.P.]. Legitimate daughters, sisters, and
lawfully wedded mothers were also included in the provision. A convenient edition is LEGES
HENRICI PRIMI (L. Downer ed. 1962). The cited provision can be found in id. at 258-59.
112. See L.H.P., supra note 111, at 88, 11-20a (L. Downer ed. at 272-77).
113. Id. at 11, 5 (L. Downer ed. at 110-11); see id. at 21, 1 (L. Downer ed. at 124-25).
114. Beckerman, Adding Insult to Iniuria:Affronts to Honor and the Originsof Trespass,in
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 57, at 159-81, 165. Beckerman discusses how the latter element disappeared in the development of the concept of tortious liability in English law.
115. In general, into the early twelfth century, one could not take vengeance for a
wrong prior to seeking legal redress ....
One exception to this rule existed in the
case of an adulterer taken in flagrante delicto by the woman's husband or immediate
male relative, who might lawfully kill him, no doubt because of the special outrage
accruing from sexual offenses.
Id. at 166; see id. at 168-69.
116. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 11 (2d ed. 1979). See
generally G. KEETON, THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE COMMON LAW (1966).
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by hanging.1 17 This substitution of mutilation for death has been identified with the so-called lex talionis,the "eye for an eye" of the Bible. 18 It
was a system of precisely measured co-opted vengeance, exercised by the
state. A typical example was the substitution of blinding and castration
for death in cases of rape.1 19
The conquering Normans were very eager to establish their authority. It was they who finally crushed the vendetta, sternly suppressing
anything like private vengeance or the prosecution of a feud, 120 with one
exception. Although somewhat limited, vengeance was still permitted in
one extreme situation. While there were signs that the outraged husband
who found his wife in the act of adultery could
no longer slay the inter121
loper, he nonetheless could emasculate him.
The Norman reforms effectively established royal justice as an act
taken by the state, for the purposes of the state. Wrongs against the
king's subjects came to be seen primarily as wrongs against the king.
Although in early Norman times injured individuals employed judicial
proceedings as a means of taking private vengeance, "by the end of the
twelfth century the jurisperiti who were making the law of the King's
courts actively believed that royal justice ought not to be used as a
means of private retribution, an instrument of revenge for wounded
honor." 122 Royal justice was to be used for kingly and not private ends.
Delictual liability thus became restricted to actual economic loss and excluded the affront to wounded honor in most cases. 123
Hidden in the obscurities of the twelfth century was a critical juncture in the development of the common law. The state was attempting to
supplant private vengeance and vendetta with action taken under its own
authority-that is, by co-optation. The Normans, particularly keen on
judicial vengeance, did this with nearly all offenses save adultery, which
became an ecclesiastical offense: jurisdiction in cases of adultery was
delegated to the Church courts. Thus, adultery became an offense punishable by the Church at a time when the state began to win acceptance
for its exclusive right to mete out punishments by co-optation of private
vengeance. Had adultery remained a wrong punishable by the state, the
problem with which this Note is concerned might not have developed.
117. Beckerman, supra note 114, at 168.
118. Exodus 21:2-22:17; Leviticus 24:20.
119. J. BAKER, supra note 116, at 430 ("The punishment was castration and blinding, or
fine and imprisonment, until 1285 when rape was made a capital felony."); 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 490; see, e.g., LEIS WILLELME cap. 18, § 2.
120. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 484-85.
121. Id. at 484. "[I]n 1212, King John orders that A who has emasculated B is to have his
land restored to him, if an inquest finds that B committed adultery with A's wife after being
forbidden to visit her." Id. at 484 n.6 (citing 1 ROTULI CURIAE REGIS 126 (London 1835)).
122. Beckerman, supra note 114, at 172.
123. Id. at 178-81.
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The state might have institutionalized the vengeance of the cuckold by
exercising it through co-optation, but the Church did not administer a
punishment sufficiently severe to co-opt the husband's vengeance. 124 The
kin of the murder victim effectively had their vengeance co-opted by the
king, who executed the murderer. This was institutionalization of revenge by co-optation. Although the death penalty was not given for
adultery, Norman law explicitly or implicitly permitted the husband
himself to act against the marital interloper, perhaps by killing him despite ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the adulterer. The state, having
failed to provide an adequate remedy, did not punish the cuckold's ven-

geance, and thus institutionalized it through permission.
III.

The Early Common Law: Emergence of
the Husband's Remedies

Common-law remedies for a husband whose wife was taken away by
another began to appear as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century. Theft of a wife, as opposed to mere adultery, was recognized as a
wrong remediable by royal justice at least as early as 1203 A.D. 125

A royal writ for abduction became available in the early thirteenth
century. 126 Its availability soon became restricted to situations in which

the king's peace had been breached by an act of violence. 127 The wrong
was to the husband, who had to allege damage to himself.128 Thus, for
124. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 367, 543-44 ("If the church had left
the matter [of sexual morality] to laymen, it is probable that some of these crimes would have
been sternly, if not savagely, punished." (footnote omitted)).
125. Curia Regis Roll no. 29 (Hil. 4 John (1203)) m. 9 (Lancaster), in 2 CURIA REGIS
ROLLS 181-82 (1925). Bracton gives a case of felonious abduction of a wife in 1223. 3 H.
BRACTON, NOTE BOOK 469, pl. 1597 (F. Maitland ed. 1887).
126. An action for the abduction of a damsel was brought in a fascinating and colorful
case of 1220, complete with rescue from a nunnery and knights in shining armour. Trin. 4
Hen. III (1220), Hertford, pl. 202, in 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 1200-1225 (1 Selden
Soc.) 135-38 (F. Maitland ed. 1888) [hereinafter SELECT PLEAS].
127. The writs were written in the ostensurus quare formula and, after initial uncertainty,
it was settled that chancery clerks would issue such writs only for those trespasses done "with
force and arms and against the king's peace (vi et armis et contrapacem Domini regis)." J.
BAKER, supra note 116, at 56-58.
128. Gyliot and Maud v. William, Y.B. 14 Edw. II (Eyre of London) (86 Selden Soc.) 12527 (1321). The concept of a wrong to the husband's round, or protection, done by the abduction, seems to survive, but the logic has been forgotten. Thus Bracton:
A person also suffers an injury, not only in his person, but also in respect of those
who are under his authority, as in respect of his children or wife. A husband may
also bring an action for an injury done to his wife, but not the converse, for it is
worthy that a wife should be defended by her husband, but not a husband by his wife.
2 H. BRACTON, DE LEOIBUS 547 (T. Twiss ed. 1879). For a more literal translation, see 2 H.
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS 438 (S. Thorne trans., G. Woodbine ed. 1968). Bracton's reason seems
curiously chivalrous.
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the husband to obtain a royal writ, his allegations of adultery 129 had to be
spiced up with allegations of other trespassory wrongs by the interloper,
such as the
taking of the husband's chattels 130 or damage to his
13 1
property.
In a colorful suit for the enormous sum of one hundred pounds,
William of Somptang complained against Thomas, the village chaplain,
that in April of 1261 Thomas broke into his house by pulling out the
eaves and took Agnes, William's wife, by force, and begat a son on her,
to William's disinheritance, and consumed and wasted his goods, and
afterwards took Agnes away, and kept her against William's will and in
breach of the king's peace. Thomas denied force and tort, and the jury
found that, although Thomas did in fact lie with Agnes, he did not break
into the house, but came in upon Agnes' invitation, and not against the
peace. Since force had not been used, the only wrong was adultery,
which was cognizable only in the church courts.
Thomas was acquitted,
132
and William was amerced for a false plaint.
In 1275, "ravishment," the taking away of a woman by force, was
criminalized by statute.1 33 The husband now had a writ of ravishment
according to the form of this statute.1 34 Ten years later, the Statute of
Westminster II had a chapter concerning women, 135 and the writ of ravishment was governed by that statute.136
These statutes made rape a felony. They also provided the cuckold
129. "Early actions for forcibly taking and abducting a wife with all her possessions almost certainly conceal elopements to which the wife in fact consented." J. BAKER, supra note
116, at 382.
130. Coke says that at common law the husband had "an action of trespasse de uxore
abducta cum bonis viri," that is, for the abduction of a wife with goods (i.e. her clothes and
jewelry). 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *434(4).
131. See, e.g., Assize Roll no. 911 m.16 (1260-61: Surrey), pl. 132, in H. RICHARDSON &
G. SAYLES, SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY III (60 Selden
Soc) 131-32.
132. Id.
133. Stat. Westm. I, 3 Edw., cap. 13, (1275), 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 45 (1763), repealed,9
Geo. 4, ch. 31, sched. 1 (1828).
134. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *434(4).
135. Stat. Westm. II, 13 Edw., cap. 34, (1285), 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 101 (1763), repealed in part, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, sched. 1 (1828), and 10 Geo. 4, ch. 34, sched. 1 (1829),
repealedwith savings by Administrations of Estates Act, 1925, ch. 23, sched. 56, sched. 2, pt. 1,
residue repealed by Statute Law Revision Act, 1948, ch. 62, sched. 1, ch. 34. The statute
reaffirmed that rape was a felony. It also provided that a wife who willingly left her husband
and lived with another in adultery during her husband's lifetime would be debarred of dower
unless the husband was willingly reconciled to her before his death. This was the law until
recently. See 5 HALISBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 442-43 (2d ed. 1948); 3 C. VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW § 202 (1935). The statute also made the abduction of a nun from
her convent punishable by three years imprisonment.
136. E.g., Coram Rege Roll no. 162 (Mich. 1300) m. 40, London pl. 8 in 3 SELECT CASES
IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER ED. I (58 Selden Soc.) 100 (G. Sayles ed. 1939)
[hereinafter SELECT CASES].
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with a remedy against the marital interloper. If the wife did not bring an
appeal of felony 137 for the rape because she had consented, her husband
or father could bring it.138 Appeal of felony, the zenith of judicial institutionalization of vengeance, was tried by battle, and loss of the battle
could result in the death of the "ravisher." However, trial by battle did
139
not last very far into the fourteenth century.
If the husband could not recover his wife from the ravisher, either
because she had divorced her husband or died, the husband could recover money damages. 14° The action would also subject the marital interloper to the brutal civil process of the time.141
A jurisdictional problem became apparent. If a wife simply went off
with another man, it was a matter touching on the marriage, and all
questions of marriage were for the ecclesiastical courts. 14 2 The Statute of
Westminster II secured royal jurisdiction by treating the abduction of a
wife entirely in terms of the chattels taken with her, usually her clothing
and jewelry. 143 If a wife simply left her husband for another man, there
was no question for the royal courts. If she and her chattels were taken
with what could be alleged to be force and arms against the king's peace,
however, the king's courts had jurisdiction. In 1310,144 for example, the
137. Proceedings by which the victim or his kin would bring the offender to justice and
prove the accusation by battle. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 605.06.
138.

2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *433.

139. J.

BAKER, supra note
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

116, at 413-14. For the procedure of trial by battle, see 3 W.
*338-41. For trial by battle generally, see H. LEA, SUPERSTI-

TION AND FORCE pt. 11 (1866) (republished as H. LEA, THE DUEL AND THE OATH (1979)).

A contemporary illustration of judicial combat may be found in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note
126, (1 Selden Soc.) frontis.
140.

2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *434(5). Coke says this action was separate from the hus-

band's action for taking away the wife as his servant, but there was no action for servitium
before the Statute of Labourers. See infra section IV.A.
141.

See F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 49-50 (1909).

142.

See, e.g., N. ADAMS & C. DONAHUE, SELECT CASES FROM THE ECCLESIASTICAL

COURTS OF THE PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY CA. 1200-1301 (95 Selden Soc.) Intro. 57, 81-88,

96, 99 (1981).
143.

T. PLUCKNETT, THE LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, at 121 (1949). A misinterpreta-

tion of these writs in the twentieth century was advanced by commentators arguing against the
"Heart Balm" actions, see infra section V.A(2). The wife was considered in terms of the chattels taken with her in order to create an action of trespass, so that a question close to marital
relations could be taken out of ecclesiastical courts for consideration in royal courts able to
mete out royal sanctions. She was not legally a chattel. Although many would argue that
wives were treated as chattels, it was not the statutes that accorded such treatment. Even if it
is said that a husband's cause of action derived from a property interest in his relationship with
his wife, it does not mean that his wife legally was property. See 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL LIABILITY 263 (1906) ("[S]he is sometimes treated as being in like case with chat-

tels, so far as to admit of the use of the ordinary common-law remedies for the redress of
wrongs done to the husband in respect of his conjugal rights."); see also G. CHAUCER, The
Wife of Bath's Tale, in THE CANTERBURY TALES (C.1388) (a woman certainly not "owned"
by anyone).
144. Gyse v. Baudewyne, Y.B. 3 Edw. 2 (22 Selden Soc.) 4-5, 205-06 (1310).
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defense to a writ of ravishment of wife14 5 was that the plaintiff was in the
process of divorcing her. Rather than allowing the case to turn on this
question of ecclesiastical law and be sent to the Bishop, the royal court
kept jurisdiction by forcing the defendant to plead the general issuethat is, to say he either did or did not ravish her. 146
Remedies could also sometimes be obtained at the local level. In
some manorial courts, it appears that a crude injunction could lie for
simple adultery. In one such case, a monk was put into the stocks by
secular authority for his adulterous relationship with a married woman,
and was told that he would return to the stocks if he did not stay away
from her.147 Several other cases148 and examples of writs149 for ravishment and abduction arose in the ensuing years of the fourteenth century.
royal remedies other than the writs of
Attempts during this period to use
1 50
ravishment and abduction failed.
145. "[fIor that.., they with force and arms ravished his wife with his goods to the value
etc. and carried her off, etc.: quare Isobel sa femme vi et armis etc. rapueruntcum bonis et
catallis ad valenciam etc. abduxerunt etc." Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 4-5, 205-06.
147. See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNURIAL
COURTS, REIGNS OF HENRY III & EDWARD 1 (2 Selden Soc.) 98 (plea in the manorial court of
the Abbott of Ramsey).
148. Coram Rege Roll no. 162 (Mich. 1300) m. 40, London pl. 58, in 3 SELECT CASES,
supra note 136, (58 Selden Soc.) 100 (1939) ("with force and arms he ravished Matilda, Gilbert
of Ashdown's wife, at London, and abducted her with Gilbert's goods and chattels and still
keeps them from him, to his loss, against the peace, and against the form of the statute");
Coram Rege Roll no. 218 (Mich. 1314) m. 7d, London pl. 20, in 4 SELECT CASES, supra note
136, (74 Selden Soc.) 59-62 (1957) (a spurious and maliciously brought action); Coram Rege
Roll no. 305 (Trinity 1336) m. 10d (crown), Lincolnshire pl. 45, in 5 SELECT CASES, supra
note 136, (76 Selden Soc.) 90-91 (1958) (Count of Lincoln sued Hugh de Frenes for the ravishment and abduction of the Countess; acquitted at trial); Anon., Y.B. Trin. I Edw. 2 (17 Selden
Soc.) 37 pl. 6 (1308) (writ of ravishment pending).
149. S. MILSoM, NOVAE NARRATIONS (80 Selden Soc.) 125 (1963) (writ B248: "wrongfully came and with force and arms abducted .4's wife and led her away and took and carried
away his chattels found there, namely clothes, wrongfully and against the peace"); id. at 328
(writ C334: "wrongfully came with force and arms and seized the wife of John and led her
away with John's chattels, namely jewelry, and broke down his hedges, against the form of the
statute provided by the King for such a case"); E. DE HAAS & G. HALL, EARLY REGISTERS
OF WRITS (87 Selden Soc.) 181, 193 (1970) (writs R324, R365: ostensurusquare) cf id. at 178
(writ R303: an early writ for causing loss of servants by violent trespass).
150. E.g., Coram Rege Roll, no. 140 (Easter 1294) m. 42 (Oxfordshire), in 3 SELECT
CASES, supra note 136, (58 Selden Soc.) lxi-lxiii, 22-23 (1939) (a writ of conspiracy would not
lie, because for abduction a common law writ was available). The king, of course, had his own
remedy. It is treason "if a man do violate the King's wife or the King's eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the King's eldest son and heir." Treason Act, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 5, ch. 2
(1351), reprinted in 5 HALISBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 452-53 (2d ed. 1948) (said to be
declaratory of the common law). Even more extreme was a statute of Henry VIII making it
treason for the woman as well, even if it had happened before her marriage to the king, and
misprision of treason for one who knew to fail to report it discreetly to the king. 33 Hen. 8 ch.
21 (1541), 2 STATUTES AT LARGE 319 (1763) (attaint of Queen Katherine Howard for High
Treason), repealed, I Edw. 6 ch. 12 (1547), 2 STATUTES AT LARGE 392 (1763) (abrogating all
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Hence, royal justice at this stage provided a remedy by a writ for
attempted marriage by capture or other "ravishment" of one's wife, but
the simple cuckold had no remedy. Royal justice could take cognizance
only of violence in breach of the king's peace, and use of force was essen-

tial to the availability of the writ. Absent the element of violence, adultery was a matter for the ecclesiastical courts, from which there were
very limited remedies,15 1 certainly none sufficient to satisfy an enraged

husband. This failure of royal justice to co-opt vengeance for adultery
while suppressing private blood-revenge led to the development of the
"'unwritten law," discussed in Section VI.

IV.
A.

The Modern Actions

The Development of the Action for Consortium

Aside from a few later statutory 152 and case law'5 3 refinements, the
royal writs of abduction and ravishment proved a dead end in the law.
For reasons that are unclear, the actions were no longer being brought by

the end of the fifteenth century. These writs originally were targeted at
remedying marriage by capture. They were replaced with actions pro-

tecting against interference with relational interests.
The new actions for enticement and harboring were derived by anal-

ogy from the Statute of Labourers, 154 which had been enacted to remedy
treasons created since the Treason Act of 1351); see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *222
("A law of Henry the Eighth made it treason also for any woman who was not a virgin, to
marry the King without informing him thereof: but this law was soon repealed, it trespassing
too strongly as well on natural justice as female modesty."); 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE
LORD CHANCELLORS 108 (4th ed. 1856) ("This law ... so much frightened all the spinsters in
Henry's court, that instead of trying to attract his notice... in the hope of wearing a crown,
they shunned his approach as if he had been himself the executioner. . . ."). But a failure to
confirm or deny a rumored royal infidelity when ordered to do so by a Council of State resulted in a criminal prosecution in The Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 Howell St. Tr. 769,
12 Co. Rep. 94, 77 Eng. Rep. 1369, Hobart 235, 80 Eng. Rep. 381 (Star Chamber 1612).
151. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 543-44.

152. 6 Rich. 2 Stat. I, ch. 6 (1382), 1 STATUTES

AT LARGE

360-61 (1763) (husband may

sue ravisher even if wife consents), repealed, S.L.R. 1863; 3 Hen. 7 ch. 2 (1486), 2 STATUTES
AT LARGE 69 (1763) (felony to carry off a propertied woman), repealed, 9 Geo. 4 ch. 31, sched.

1 (1828), 29

371 (1829), & 10 Geo. 4 ch. 34, sched. 1 (1829), 29 STAT769 (1829); 4 & 5 Phil. & M. ch. 8 (1557), 2 STATUTES AT LARGE 515-16

STATUTES AT LARGE

UTES AT LARGE

(1763) (extended to the taking away of any woman), repealed, 9 Geo. 4 ch. 31, sched. 1 (1828),

29

STATUTES AT LARGE 371 (1829).
VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY

153. E.g., 20 C.

450, L.2, no.

4 (London 1744) (citing Y.B. 43 Edw. 3 23 (1369)) (the action could be brought against a
woman as well). A spurious and malicious appeal of rape was brought against an unpopular
recorder of London, spiced up with lurid allegations befitting a satyr. Athern v. Bigg, Y.B. 1
Hen. 6 (50 Selden Soc.) 1-10 (1422).
154. 23 Edw. 3 (1349), 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 248-49 (1763); 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 1(1350), 1
STATUTES AT LARGE

251 (1763), repealed, S.L.R. 1863.
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the labor shortage caused by the Black Death. 155 It punished both the
servants who left their employment without reasonable cause and those
who enticed, retained, or harbored deserting servants. By 1530, a master
was able to sue another who had enticed a servant away from his ema master of his servant was
ploy.' 5 6 The action for wrongfully depriving
157
the action per quod servitium amisit.
Gradually, this action was extended to protect from wrongful taking
any person in whom the plaintiff had a property interest. For example, it
extended to protect a father from the taking of a child in which he had a
property interest (an heir). 158 By 1619, the courts extended by analogy
the action per quod servitium amisit to the loss of a wife's services.15 9
The husband's action was analogous to the master's, but it was based on
a loss of consortium rather than loss of services. Consortium is a bundle
of rights arising out of the marital relationship, including rights to aid,
comfort, society, services, and exclusive sexual relations.' 60 The concept
of consortium 6developed
as the wife's status within the marital relation1
ship changed.1
Significantly, the action for loss of consortium became recognized as
an action on the case.162 The courts recognized that a harm to the wife
was not a direct harm to the husband, but rather was a wrong that
caused him consequential harm by impairing his right to marital consortium. A husband's right to marital consortium could be harmed by a
163
defendant's negligent or intentional act.
Actions for interference with marital consortium are brought today.
155. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-60 (3d ed. 1923). For a
contemporary account of the labor shortage, see Chronicon HenriciKnighton, 2 ROLLS SERIES
58 (J. Lumby ed. 1895), translatedin 4 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1327-1485, at 8991 (A. Myers ed. 1969).
156. J. BAKER, supra note 116, at 381.
157. See Jones, Per Quod Servitium Amisit, 74 LAW Q. REv. 39 (1958).
158. Barham v. Dennis, Cro. Eliz. 770, 78 Eng. Rep. 1001 (K.B. Trin. 42 Eliz. (1600)).
159. Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (K.B. Mich. 16 Jac. 1 (1619)). In
that case, the court said that
the action is not brought in respect of the harm done to the wife, but it is brought for
the particular loss of the husband, for that he lost the company of his wife, which is
only a damage and loss to himself, for which he shall have this action, as the master
shall have for the loss of his servant's services.
Id. at 501, 79 Eng. Rep. at 428. Another early case is Hyde v. Scyssor, Cro. Jac. 538, 79 Eng.
Rep. 462 (K.B. Trin. 17 Jac. I (1620)) (husband's action for loss of his wife's "company and
aid").
160.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 comment c (1977).

161. See Lippman, supra note 48, at 651.
162. See, e.g., Duke of Norfolk v. Germaine, 12 Howell St. Tr. 927, 927 (K.B. 1692);
MacFazden v. Olivant, 6 East 387, 390-91, 102 Eng. Rep. 1335, 1336 (K.B. 1805). Contra
Ditcham v. Bond, 2 M. & S. 436, 437, 105 Eng. Rep. 443, 443 (1814); Woodward v. Walton, 2
Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) 476, 483, 127 Eng. Rep. 715, 718 (C.P. 1807).
163.

1984).

W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 124-125 (5th ed.
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Most commonly, these are for negligence,164 but actions for intentional
interference were once fairly common and usually involved sexual misconduct. These actions are discussed in the next section, and the story of
their decline will be told in the subsequent one.
B. Torts of Intentional Interference with Consortium
(1) Criminal Conversation
A cuckold may bring an action of criminal conversation-adultery-against a marital interloper. 165 The action for criminal conversa166
tion is an action for the loss of consortium inherent in the adultery.
167 but, although
The action was abolished in England over a century ago,
1 68
today.
States
moribund, it does exist in the United
Although adultery was a concern of the Church courts 169 and not a
crime at common law,170 it became a concern of the common-law courts
through the action for criminal conversation as the peculiarities of English divorce law emerged. By the end of the seventeenth century, there
was but a single route to procuring a dissolution of marriage. Adultery
was the only ground for dissolving a marriage, 17' and so the first step
toward dissolution was to prove the adultery by winning an action for
criminal conversation, which conveniently appeared at about this time.
Then the ecclesiastical courts had to grant a marital separation.' 72 Finally, a petition for dissolution of marriage had to be presented to the
House of Lords for a vote. If the bill passed, the marriage was legally
dissolved.173 Practically, this procedure made divorce the privilege of the
174
very rich because litigation and private lobbying were very expensive.
164. Id. § 125.
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 685 (1977).
166. "The essential injury to the husband consists in the defilement of the marriage bedin the invasion of his exclusive right to marital intercourse with his wife, and to beget his own
children. This presumes the loss of the consortium with his wife .... " Bigaouette v. Paulet,
134 Mass. 123, 125 (1881); see also Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 481-90 (1904). "Where
adultery is proved or admitted, loss of consortium is conclusively presumed." Shedrick v.
Lathrop, 106 Vt. 311, 316, 172 A. 630, 632 (1934).
167. Stat. 20 & 21 Vict. ch. 85, sched. 59 (1857).
168. See infra section V.A(2).
169. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139; 4 id. *65; 2 R. BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL
LAW 401-05 (9th ed. London 1842); R. GREY, A SYSTEM OF ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL LAW

351 (4th ed. London 1743).
170. E.g., Rigault v. Galizard, 7 Mod. 78, 81-82, 87 Eng. Rep. 1106, 1108, Holt K.B. 597,
598, 90 Eng. Rep. 1230, 1231, 2 Salk. 552, 552, 91 Eng. Rep. 467, 468 (Mich. I Anne (1702))
(this case recognized a civil action). Adultery was made a capital crime by statute under the
Commonwealth. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
171. J. BAKER, supra note 116, at 407.
172. This separation was a divorce a mensa et thoro, from bed and board. Id.
173. Id. at 406-07; Holdsworth, The EcclesiasticalCourts and Their Jurisdiction, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 55 (1908).
174. See Judge Maule's address to the prisoner, a convicted bigamist, in Regina v. Hall,

November 1986]

ADULTERY, LAW, AND THE STATE

Out of this procedure, however, grew the notion that the action of criminal conversation could be brought for its own sake, to seek compensation
from or to harm the marital interloper.175
The action could be used to "punish" the marital interloper. Lord
Mansfield said that "an action of criminal conversation has a mixture 177
of
penal prosecution," 176 and requested damages could be enormous.
The consent of the wife, 178 or even that of the husband, 179 would not bar
the action, but such facts were relevant for mitigation of damages. Because the action belonged to the husband for his loss, the wife's consent

was immaterial. 180

The Times (London), Apr. 3, 1845, reprintedin L. BLOM-COOPER,

THE LAW AS LITERATURE

285-87 (1961).

175. Blackstone wrote:
Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public crime,
left by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts; yet, considered as a civil injury
(and surely there can be no greater,) the law gives a satisfaction to the husband for it
by action of trespass vi et armis against the adulterer, wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary. But these are properly increased or diminished by circumstances; as the rank and fortune of the plaintiff and defendant;
the relation or connection between them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife,
founded on her previous behavior and character; and the husband's obligation by
settlement or otherwise to provide for those children, which he cannot but suspect to
be spurious.
3 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140.

176. Birt v. Barlow, I Dougl. 171, 174, 99 Eng. Rep. 113, 114 (K.B. 1779). Compare
Weedon v. Trumbell, 5 T.R. 357, 360, 101 Eng. Rep. 199, 201 (K.B. 1783) ("[lt is a civil
action, brought to recover satisfaction for a civil injury done to the husband, and not to punish
the defendant for having broken the laws of morality and decency ....") with Chambers v.
Caulfield, 6 East 244, 249, 102 Eng. Rep. 1280, 1282 (1805) ("Weedon v. Trumbell is not
founded on any former precedent in the lawL;] all principles of morality and public policy are
the other way.").
177. E.g., Duke of Norfolk v. Germaine, 12 Howell St. Tr. 927, 948 (K.B. 1692) (£100,000
sought in action on the case for criminal conversation; approximately £5 was awarded, but the
Duke got the divorce he wanted by private Act of Parliament eight years later.).
178. Rogers v. Goddard, 2 Shaw K.B. 255, 89 Eng. Rep. 925 (Hil. 34 & 35 Car. 2 (1684));
see Davis v. Cochran, 42 Ga. App. 215, 217, 155 S.E. 379, 380 (1930); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 685 comment e (1977).
179. Coot v. Berty, 12 Mod. 232, 232, 88 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1283-84 (K.B. Mich. 10 Wil. 3
(1699)) (plea that the "husband had bargained and sold her to the adulterer" held bad; "license
by husband to wife to lie with another man, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action of trespass
by husband; nor that she was a notorious lewd woman; but these matters may be given in
mitigation of damages."). ContraRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 687-688 (1977) (but
condonation does not bar suit); cf Kenny, Wfe-Selling in England, 45 LAW Q. REv. 494
(1929).
180. Furthermore, by the law at the time of the origin of the action, if a raped woman
conceived, it raised the conclusive presumption that she had consented. T. BLOUNT, NoMoLEXIKON: A LAW DICTIONARY, Rape (2d ed. London 1691) ("[flor she cannot conceive unless she consent."). Although the wife had legally "consented," the husband still was
grievously wronged and fortunately had a cause of action.
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(2) Enticement

Enticement was a civil action by a husband against another who had
unjustifiably persuaded his wife to leave him. 18 1 The action appeared in
England in the mid-eighteenth century with the case of Winsmore v.
Greenbank.182 Unlike the old action for abduction, the action for enticement was directed at one who used charm, rather than physical force, to
entice away the wife of another. Accordingly, enticement was considered
an action on the case rather than an action of trespass because the husband's loss was considered an indirect consequence of the defendant's
wrong rather than directly and immediately caused by it.183 Distinctions
are no longer made between trespass and case; the lines are now drawn
between intentional and negligent acts,18 4 and enticement is an intentional act. Like the other actions for interference with marriage, enticement was also based on loss of consortium.1 85
(3) Alienation of Affections
In the United States, not only did enticement and harboring exist as
separate torts, but an indigenous version of these torts developed in the
mid-nineteenth century.186 The action for alienation of affections renders
liable one who purposefully alienates the affections of another's
spouse.' 8 7 The action for alienation of affections is also based on loss of

consortium. 188 It usually subsumes the actions for criminal conversation
and enticement, 89 which are theoretically separate torts, although they
are often brought together. 90 An important element in an action for
alienation of affections is the mental anguish caused by the loss of the
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 684 (1977); see id. §§ 686-688 (examples of
justifications).
182. Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (C.P. 1745); cf S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 292 (2d ed. 1981) ("Before that date, so far as the legal records
go, Englishmen had kept austerely to kidnapping."). But see supra section III.
183. Harboring, the tort of persuading a spouse to remain away from the other spouse,
was technically a separate tort, although it was usually subsumed in an action for enticement.
See Winchester v. Fleming, [1958] 1 Q.B. 259, (H.L.); Payne, Enticing and Harbouring
Spouses, 21 MOD. L. REV. 296 (1958). No action lies for harboring the plaintiff's wife if
defendant's motive is humanitarian, to secure her from the ill treatment of her husband.
Berthan v. Cartwright, 2 Esp. 480, 170 Eng. Rep. 426 (1796); Philip v. Squire, Peake 114, 170
Eng. Rep. 99 (1791).
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 684(l) (1977).
185. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).
186. See generally Brown, The Action for Alienation ofAffections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472
(1934).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 683, 686 (1977).
188. "The gist of both the action for alienation of affections and that for criminal conversation is the same, the loss of the consortium." Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, 561, 111 A.
869, 872 (1920).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 683-685 (1977).
190. See, e.g., Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 205-06, 170 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1969).
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spouse's love. Actions for alienation of affections were formerly relatively common in America. In England, however, the comparable action
of enticement was rarely brought.191
V.

Co-optive Remedies Available Through the State

The state may institutionalize a cuckold's vengeance by co-optation
or by permission. Effective co-optation would require the state to act in a
way that would harm the marital interloper to such an extent that the
husband would consider personal vengeance unnecessary. If the state
fails to do this effectively, it will have to institutionalize by permission
that vengeance which it does not co-opt. The common law never effectively co-opted the vengeance of the discovering cuckold. It provided
remedies that co-opted it to some extent, but because the co-optation was
not complete, legal permission had to coexist with legal co-optation.
Two courses of action, therefore, are open to the discovering cuckold. He may rely on the branch of the law that permits him to exercise
his vengeance, 19 2 or he may have his vengeance effectively co-opted by
remedies available through the state's legal system, as discussed in this
section.
Within the judicial system there are three options: the cuckold may
sue for damages in one of the common-law consortium actions, he may
go to equity and seek an injunction, or he may use the authority of the
state to punish the adulterer by filing a criminal complaint. The availability of these remedies varies among jurisdictions.
A.

Civil Actions at Common Law

(1)

Damagesin Consortium Actions

Earlier this century and to a limited extent today, the wronged husband might have tried to avenge himself on the marital interloper by
putting him to the expense of defending a civil action and exposing him
to the risk of paying large money damages. In a consortium action, the
plaintiff is entitled to his actual economic loss, such as his share of his
wife's inheritance, 193 and punitive damages.
There are many reported cases of large damage awards.1 94 In assessing damages, the jury has virtually unlimited discretion and commonly will award large compensatory and punitive damages. 195 In a suit
191. "There seems to be no reported case between 1796 and 1904." Place v. Searle, [1932]
2 K.B. 497, 501. In that case, the court held that the action still existed. Id. at 512; see Note, 5
CAMBRIDGE

L.J. 112 (1933).

192. See infra section VI.
193. Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745).

194. See 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife §§ 696 n.84, 706 n.67 (1944 & Supp. 1985).
195. Brown, supra note 186, at 499-503.
The injury, though not precisely measureable, justifies substantial damages .... In
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against an archetypal homewrecker, 196 the jury typically will award large
punitive damages to soothe the plaintiff's injured honor and mental

anguish. 197 Damages have at times been large enough to ruin the defend-

ant. Evidence of the defendant's wealth is admissible in determining the
amount of punitive damages, 198 but the defendant's poverty will not protect him from an exorbitant award. 199 Ill treatment of the wife by her
husband2 ° and low moral character of the husband or wife20 1 will not
bar a suit, but they are factors considered in mitigation of damages.
There are several drawbacks to this remedy: the length of time it
might take to gain satisfaction, the public exposure and humiliation to
which the plaintiff and his innocent family members are subject, and the
doubts potentially cast on the legitimacy of the plaintiff's children. Furthermore, the damages may be inadequate compensation. Despite these
limitations, actions for criminal conversation and alienation of affections
became increasingly popular in the 1920s. 20 2 However, the very popularity of the actions for intentional interference with marriage eventually
proved to be their downfall.
(2) The Decline of the Actions
The actions for deliberate interference with marriage, along with the
actions for breach of promise to marry and seduction, became known as
view of the obvious vagueness of the basis for computing compensatory damage it
clearly follows there is no definite line between compensatory and punitive damages
.... [T]o justify an award of punitive damages, malice in its strict sense, or at least a
wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, must be shown.
Id. at 500-01.
196. E.g., Eclov v. Birdsong, 166 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
197. "The degradation which ensues, the distress and mental anguish which necessarily
follow, are the real causes of recovery." Botwinick v. Annenberg, 204 A.D. 436, 439, 198
N.Y.S. 151, 153 (1923) (quoting Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 Ill. 9, 12 (1866)).
198. Brown, supra note 186, at 502 ("This is obviously justifiable, since the adequate punishment of a wealthy person will obviously require much higher damages than if he were
comparatively poor.").
199. E.g., Wilford v. Berkeley, 1 Burr 609, 609, 97 Eng. Rep. 472, 472 (1758) (£500
against a part time Exchequer clerk who earned £50 a year not excessive, "for, the injury
suffered by the husband, and the estimate of the damages to be assessed.., depend entirely
upon circumstances, which it was strictly and properly the province of the jury to be the judge
of"); Elliott v. Nicklin, 5 Price 641, 146 Eng. Rep. 719 (Exch. 1818) (£1000 against an unemployed minor living at home not excessive).
200. Winter v. Wroot, I M. & Rob. 404, 174 Eng. Rep. 140 (1834).
201. Calcroft v. Earl of Harbrough, 4 C. & P. 499, 172 Eng. Rep. 798 (1831) (plaintiff's
wife was an actress; £100 damages).
202. This was determined by a statistical assessment of the citations in 42 C.J.S. Husband
and Wife §§ 692-696 (1944 & Supp. 1985). The verdicts in the 1920s ranged from five to
twenty thousand dollars. Larger awards include: Mohn v. Tingley, 191 Cal. 470, 217 P. 733
(1923) ($75,000 compensatory and $25,000 punitive); Overton v. Overton, 121 Okla. 1, 246 P.
1095 (1926) ($150,000 reduced to $60,000); Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 A. 758
(1925) ($465,000 reduced to $125,000).
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"Heart Balm" actions. 20 3 Probably as a backlash to the actions' increasmovement
ing popularity and jury awards, an anti-"Heart 2Balm"
°4
emerged in the 1930s and quickly swept the country.
There were fears that these actions were brought to extort money
out of innocent defendants who did not want publicity, and those willing
20 5
to publicize their intimate disgraces were viewed with suspicion.
However, there was no proof that the actions
for consortium were being
20 6
abused any more than other tort actions.
England 207 and many American states abolished these actions by
statute,20 8 and state supreme courts continue to abolish them.20 9 Other
However, the action
states have tightly limited the available remedies.212 10
1
retains its vitality in parts of the United States.
203. For a detailed history of this subject, see Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790,
791-94 (Iowa 1981); Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 788-804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), vacated,
313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985); Note, Heartbalm Statutes andDeceitActions, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1770 (1985).
204. The leading law review articles published as part of this national debate include
Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "'HeartBalm," 33 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1935); Feinsinger,
CurrentLegislation Affecting Breach ofPromise to Marry, Alienation ofAffections, and Related
Actions, 10 Wisc. L. REv. 417 (1935); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1923); Kane, HeartBalm and Public Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63

(1936); Lippman, supra note 48.
205. The action that incurred the most public distaste was the action for breach of promise
to marry, which was often abused. See F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

302-61 (4th ed. 1936).
206. See Kane, supra note 204, at 66.
207. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, sched. 5.
208.

E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CiV. CODE § 43.5 (West

1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (West
Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); GA.

CODE ANN. § 1-1-17 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1981) (criminal offense to file such an action); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West 1968); MINN. STAT.

ANN. § 553.02 (West Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 81 (McKinney 1976) (criminal offense to file such an action); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.29 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.850 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-220 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (West 1981) (criminal offense to file such an
action); Wyo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977) (same).
209. E.g., Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981); Kline v. Ansell,
287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976).
210. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1985) (one year statute of limitations on
alienation of affections and criminal conversation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 1901-1907
(Smith-Hurd 1980) (no punitive damages for alienation of affections); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.140(1)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970) (one year statute of limitations on alienation of
affections and criminal conversation); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1986)
(two year statute of limitations on criminal conversation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-37-50 (Law. Co-op 1976) (limitation on recoverable costs); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (one year statute of limitations for alienation of affections).
211. E.g., Schoenecke v. Ronnigen, 315 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1982) ($122,000 alienation of
affections verdict reduced to $50,000); Vacek v. Ames, 221 Neb. 333, 377 N.W.2d 86 (1985)
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It seems that spousal love has been removed from the definition of

consortium. Actions for loss of consortium caused by physically incapacitating injury may still be brought, but jurisdictions that permit an
action for deliberately causing the loss of the love of the other spouse are

increasingly rare, "because spousal love is not property subject to
2 12
theft."

B. Equity
In some jurisdictions, the cuckold may obtain equitable relief by

way of injunction. 213 Such an injunction prohibits the marital interloper

from seeing or communicating with the cuckold's wife. Most courts
presented with the question have denied injunctive relief, because en2 14
forcement is both impractical and a severe invasion of personal liberty.
Some commentators have urged that the equitable remedy of injunction be made available. 2 15 While damages can only compensate for harm
already done, an injunction might prevent the damage from arising at all.
New Jersey has agreed with these commentators in theory, although not
in practice, 216 but Georgia, 217 Alabama, 21 8 and especially Texas, 2 19 have

granted injunctions.
The first reported case to present the question, and the centerpiece
($100,000 jury verdict for alienation of affections not excessive); Creason v. Myers, 217 Neb.
551, 558, 350 N.W.2d 526, 530 (1984); Zarrella v. Robinson, 460 A.2d 415 (R.I. 1983); Nelson
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).
212. Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981).
213. See generally Brown, supra note 186, at 503-04; Moreland, Injunctive ControlofFamily Relations, 18 Ky. L. REV. 207 (1930); Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality,29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 674-75 (1916); Schoonover, Comment: Piracy
on the MatrimonialSeas-The Law and the MaritalInterloper,25 Sw. L.J. 594, 607-08 (1971).
214. E.g., Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924) (injunction dissolved by
Ohio Supreme Court as "extreme"); see Recent Decision, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 373 (1925);
Recent Case, 38 HARV. L. REV. 396 (1925); Recent Case, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1925); Recent
Case Note, 34 YALE L.J. 327 (1925). More recent cases denying injunctive relief include Lyon
v. Izen, 131 Ill. App. 2d 94, 268 N.E.2d 436 (1971); White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 85
N.E.2d 246 (1949).
215. Moreland, supra note 213, at 224 ("[T]he remedy at law is not adequate, and a property right on which to ground the injunction can be found if the court does not care to protect
personal rights, as such."); Schoonover, supra note 213, at 609 ("[I]n extreme instances equitable relief should be available.... ."); cf. Brown, supra note 186, at 503-04 (1934) ("[W]here the
plaintiff acts soon enough, he ought to be entitled to relief by having the defendant enjoined
from acting in such a way as to deprive the plaintiff of consortium ... because of the obvious
inadequacy of the legal remedy of damages ... ." But Brown concludes that the practical
obstacles are too formidable.).
216. E.g., Devine v. Devine, 20 N.J. Super. 522, 90 A.2d 126 (1952).
217. E.g., Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919).
218. E.g., Latham v. Kanger, 267 Ala. 433, 103 So. 2d 336 (1958).
219. Smith v. Womack, 271 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S.W.
1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Exparte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
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220
for subsequent debate, was the 1899 Texas case of Ex parte Warfield.
In that case, an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus had been enjoined
from visiting Mrs. Morris or from interfering with Mr. Morris' attempts
to communicate with her. The applicant had violated the terms of the
injunction, was fined one hundred dollars, and was ordered to serve three
days in jail. The Texas Supreme Court denied the habeas corpus petition, stating that it was fully within the lower court's equitable jurisdiction to issue such an injunction. 221 Subsequent cases have upheld similar
222
injunctions.
Commentators have addressed two main issues in this area: first,
the academic issue of whether the court is protecting property rights or
personal rights, and second, the practical issue of whether the courts
should be enjoining extra-marital affairs. Whether it is a personal or a
property right that is protected, an injunction is a great invasion of personal liberty. An injunction is, however, the most "civilized" of the remedies available to the discovering cuckold. It is a preventive measure,
rather than vengeful, designed to allow the husband to restore happy
marital relations with his wife. It does not actually damage the interloper in his person or his property. It is also not very co-optive of any
vengeance that the cuckold might desire.

C. The Criminal Law
In the few jurisdictions where adultery remains a crime, the husband may decide to avenge himself on the marital interloper by invoking
the heavy wrath of the criminal law.
Adultery was not a common-law crime, but rather was an ecclesiastical offense. With the decline of ecclesiastical authority, the offense grew
less severely punished. 223 However, due to our Puritan heritage, adultery
has been a crime in most American jurisdictions. 224 In 1650, the Puritans of the Commonwealth made adultery a capital offense by statute, 225
and although this statute was nullified after the Restoration, 226 the Puritans in the American colonies made adultery with a married woman a
227
capital offense.
In colonial times, adultery was seen almost entirely as an offense
220. 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
221. Id. at 425-28, 50 S.W. at 936-38.
222. E.g., Smith v. Womack, 271 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Witte v. Bauderer, 255
S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
223. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 543-44.
224. For a brief history, see United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 578 (D. Or. 1888).
225. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64-65.
226. As was all Commonwealth legislation. Stat., 12 Car. 2, cap. 12 (1660).
227. Commonwealth v. Call, 28 Mass. (21 Pick.) 509, 511 (1839); Wolford, The Laws and
Liberties of 1648, 28 B.U.L. REv. 426, 461 (1948); cf N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850) (portraying the life of an unwed mother in colonial New England).
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against morality and chastity and far less as a wrong against the hus229
band. 228 As in all capital cases of the time, convictions were rare.
This Puritan legacy, however, remained with us, and adultery was made
an offense by statute in most states. 230 These statutes were so poorly
enforced that their effect was to breed disrespect for law while providing
an opportunity for blackmail. 231 In 1955, the American Law Institute
recommended in its Model Penal Code that adultery be decriminalized, 232 and many states have followed that recommendation. 233 Where
it survives, the crime is usually a misdemeanor, 234 but in some jurisdictions, it has merited imprisonment. 235 Adultery prosecutions still take
228.

In Rhode Island in 1661 a husband forfeited his bond of;£10 when his wife failed to

appear to answer a charge of adultery. R. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 194 (2d ed. 1959) (citing Hick's Case, 1 R.I. Court Rec. 76, 77, 79 (1661-62)).

229. Wolford, supra note 227, at 461.
230. Examples of current statutes include COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-01 (1973); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-301 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2009
(Harrison 1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-7(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4 (1957) ($10 fine); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, § 14 (West 1970) (up to three years imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.29-.30 (West 1968) (felony); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West Supp. 1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-704 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 255.17 (McKinney 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 871-872 (West 1983) (up to five
years imprisonment); R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-6-2 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-60, -70
(Law. Co-op. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (1982
& Supp. 1985) (Virginia also criminalizes conspiring to cause one's spouse to commit adultery.
Id. § 18.2-367.); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1984) (minimum $20 fine); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16
(West 1982). For American adultery laws generally, see 2 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW §§ 214-216 (1979 & Supp. 1985).
231. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 455 (3d ed. 1982).
232. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comments at 204-10 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
233. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 269a-269b (West 1955), repealed by 1975 Cal. Stat. ch.
71, §§ 5-6, 131, 133, commented upon in Finz, California'sNew Sex Law: A Beginning, 1
CRIM. JUST. J. 79 (1976), and Note, Updating California'sSex Code, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 65
(1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.1 (West 1950), repealed by 1976 Iowa Acts (66 G.A.) ch.
1245, ch. 4, § 526 (effective Jan. 1, 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-908 (1964), repealedby 1969
Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 180, § 21-4701 (effective July 1, 1970); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.070
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970), repealed by 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, § 336 (effective Jan. 1, 1975);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 101 (1964), repealedby 1975 Me. Laws ch. 499, § 5 (effective
May 1, 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:88-1 (West 1969), repealed by 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 95,
§ 2C:98-2 (effective Sept. 1, 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-09 (1960), repealed by 1973
N.D. Laws ch. 117, § 4; OR. REV. STAT. § 167.005 (1965), repealedby 1971 Or. Laws ch. 743,
§ 432; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4505 (Purdon 1963), repealed by 1972 Pa. Laws No. 335 § 5;
S.D. COMP. LAWS §§ 22-22-17, -18 (1967), repealed by 1976 S.D. Laws ch. 158, § 22-8; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 201-202 (1979), repealed by 1981 Vt. Laws No. 223 (Adj. Sess.) § 24;
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.110 (1961), repealed by 1975 Wash. Laws 1st ex.s. ch. 260,
§ 9A.92.010 (effective July 1, 1976). But see practice commentary to N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 255.17 (McKinney 1980).
234. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408(A) (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2009 (Harrison 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4 (1957) ($10 fine); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1984)
(minimum $20 fine).
235. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (1958) (up to two years imprisonment), modified by

November 1986]

ADULTERY, LAW, AND THE STATE

place, and the statutes have consistently withstood attacks on their
236
validity.
Prosecutions for adultery are rare, and although the husband may
have the option of filing a criminal complaint, 237 the actual decision to
prosecute is not his. Furthermore, if there is a prosecution, the same
humiliation to the husband and his family that occurs in the civil actions
can take place.
Thus, Puritanism, and the absence of any ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
led to the incorporation of sanctions against adultery in American criminal law, but these laws do not always effectively co-opt the cuckold's
vengeance. Laws that more effectively institutionalized the cuckold's
vengeance, by permission, are discussed in the next section.
VI.

Permission: The "Unwritten Law"

The "unwritten law" 23 8 is part of the American legal system and has
institutionalized the cuckold's vengeance by permitting direct action.
The husband, upon discovering his wife and the marital interloper in the
act of adultery, might choose to kill the marital interloper then and there
without later suffering a conviction for homicide.
The "unwritten law" alters the conclusions that would otherwise be
reached under criminal law. If a husband, upon discovering an act of
adultery, forms a conscious plan to kill the interloper and carries it out,
1977 Ala. Acts No. 607, § 7005, to ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1982) (misdemeanor); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-221 (1956) (up to three years imprisonment), modified by 1977 Ariz. Sess.
Laws ch. 142, § 64 (effective Oct. 1, 1978) (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1408 (1978)) (now a misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-218 (West 1958) (up
to five years imprisonment), modified by 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 828, § 82 (effective Oct. 1,
1971) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-81 (West 1985)) (now a misdemeanor); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 1970) (up to three years imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.29-.30 (West 1968) (felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

21, §§ 871-872 (West 1983) (up to five years imprisonment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 203
(1974) (up to three years imprisonment if caught in bed), repealed by 1979 Vt. Laws No. 152
(Adj. Sess.).
A federal statute makes it a felony to transport a woman across state lines for any immoral purpose. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982)). This act has been used to prosecute adulterous
interstate liaisons. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916); Reamer v. United
States, 318 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963) (prosecution for interstate "date").
236. See, e.g., Kraus v. Barrington Hills, 571 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ill. 1982); State v.
Ronek, 176 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1970); Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 49 N.E.2d
357 (1983); Annotation, Validity of Statute Making Adultery and Fornication Criminal Offenses, 41 A.L.R. 3D 1338 (1972).
237. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408(B) (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36(2)
(West 1984).
238. See 43A WORDS AND PHRASES 197 (1969).
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he commits murder. 239 If the discovery provokes the husband to such a
heat of passion that he kills the interloper before his passions have
cooled, he commits manslaughter, 24° sometimes said to be manslaughter
of "the lowest degree. '24 1 In theory, the finding by a husband of an

interloper in bed with his wife should be taken as a circumstance tending

242 In some states, however,
to show adequate provocation.
it has been
24 3
per se adequate provocation.
There are two manifestations of the unwritten law. The first is a
state's decision not to prosecute the husband for homicide, because
avenging an incident of adultery is legal in the jurisdiction. In such a
case, the unwritten law is in fact "written." The second is the jury's

refusal to convict the cuckold of the charged offense. This is the "unwritten" part of the unwritten law.
A.

The Origins of the "Unwritten Law"

The "unwritten law" emerged from the power and willingness of a
jury to refuse to convict a man charged with a law that members of the
jury did not like. 244 This unwillingness to convict originated after almost
all homicides were classified as capital offenses.2 4 5 The early English
239. See generally 10. WARREN & B. BILAS, WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 96 (1938 & Supp.
1962).
240. Rex v. Maddey, 1 Vent. 158, 86 Eng. Rep. 108 (K.B. 1670) (record is in A. KJRALFY,
A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 32-34 (1957)); Regina v. Mawgridge, Kelying 119, 137

n.1, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 n.1 (Q.B. Hil. 5 Anne (1707)) ("but this law hath been executed
with great benignity"); State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458 (1929).
241. Blackstone wrote that
if a man takes another in the act of adultery with his wife and kills him directly upon
the spot... it is not absolutely ranked in the class of justifiable homicide.., but it is
manslaughter. It is, however, the lowest degree of it; and therefore in such a case the
court directed the burning in the hand to be lightly inflicted, because there could not
be a greater provocation.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *191-92.

242. Note, The Unwritten Law as a Defense to Homicide, 19 NEB. L. BULL. 146, 147
(1940).
243. See, e.g., State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 181, 50 A. 37, 39 (1901); 2 BISHoP's CRIMINAL
LAW § 708 (9th ed. 1923).
244. See generally Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74
MICH. L. REV. 413 (1976) [hereinafter Green, Jury andHomicide]; Green, Societal Conceptsof
Criminal Liabilityfor Homicide in Medieval England, 47 SPECULUM 669 (1972) [hereinafter
Green, Societal Concepts].
245. Henry II expanded the king's peace to cover all cases of homicide, suppressed private
composition, and made all homicides capital except the most desperate self-defense. Green,
Jury and Homicide, supra note 244, at 417-20. These highly formal and inelastic rules would
have hanged many who would otherwise have been able to make composition, or who were not
truly culpable of murder. "In an age without police so that even the good citizen could hardly
avoid participation in fights, and without much medical knowledge so that wounds were often
fatal, killing was a hazard of the same order as today's involvement in a road accident." S.
MiLSOM, supra note 182, at 422.
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jury was self-informing and composed of persons supposed to have a
first-hand knowledge of the events and persons in question: "The judge
instructed the jury on the law, but was himself almost entirely dependent
upon the jury for his knowledge of the case."'246 The trial jury thus had
the power to state the verdict in a form that compelled the judgment it
believed the defendant deserved, and thereby to effectively amend established laws to reflect prevailing social attitudes. 247 Further, "[]urors
made unacceptable rules produce acceptable results by adjusting the
facts, and since it was the result that they desired to control,
any facts
'248
they stated would be those of a clear and predictable case."
Juries believing that a defendant should not be hanged soon developed a formulaic verdict that the defendant had been cornered by the
deceased and could not otherwise have escaped death. 249 Once they
agreed upon a verdict, the jurors stuck to their story. They could also
find a defendant entirely innocent and acquit. By the mid-fourteenth
century, juries were acquitting or giving verdicts of self-defense in eighty
250
percent of homicide cases.
Among these cases were homicides committed by a husband who
had discovered his wife in bed with an interloper. Thus, in a case in
1341, the jurors were faced with a murder prosecution of a husband who,
upon finding his wife and the interloper in bed together, had taken revenge with an axe. The petty jury found the defendant had killed the
interloper because he was under attack and could not otherwise have
25 1
escaped death.
Similar refusals by juries to render guilty verdicts in cases in which
they believed the killing was justified became the "unwritten law." This
compassion became most famous in cases of a husband killing a marital
interloper.
B. The Written Part of the "Unwritten Law": Justifiable Homicide
Some American states, either by statute or judicial decision, made it
legal for a husband to kill an interloper caught in the act of adultery with
his wife.2 52 This legalization represented institutionalization of the cuck246.

Green, Jury and Homicide, supra note 244, at 414.

247. Id.
248.

S. MILSoM, supra note 182, at 422.

249. "[M]edieval juries tended to characterize felonious but not especially heinous homicides as acts of self-defense." Green, Jury and Homicide, supra note 244, at 427.
250. Id. at 430-32.
251. Green, Societal Concepts, supra note 244, at 679-80.
252. The civil law provides an interesting comparison. Its primary difference from the
common law is that since ancient times the cuckold was allowed to kill the wife as well as the
marital interloper. The law permitted slaying as an immediate expression of the husband's just
resentment, rather than an exercise of the ancient Roman patriapotestas. 2 B. COHEN, JEWISH AND ROMAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 635 (1966) (citing I WESTRUP, INTRODUC-
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old's vengeance by explicit permission. This section presents those laws.
It also compares the statutory scheme that was used by Texas with the
judicial solution reached by Georgia. In discussing these rules, the marital interloper will be referred to as the "paramour," the term used by the
courts.
There are advantages for a state willing to commit the "unwritten
law" to writing. If sympathetic prosecutors or juries follow the unwritten law in contravention of existing statutes, then it would improve the
perceived authority of the state to incorporate the unwritten law explicitly in its statutory scheme. If the state asserts that it is the source of the
legality of a practice, that assertion may gradually be accepted, and the
state, as source of the law, may be able to change it. Further, if an act of
violence must be tolerated, it is better for the state if the act is seen as
conforming with the law of the state. Explicit acquiescence enhances the
state's perceived authority; forced
toleration of an "illegal" act discredits
253
the state's laws and authority.
(1)

Texas

The Texas justifiable homicide statute essentially permitted vengeance.2 54 The Texas statute was not an attempt to co-opt the cuckold's
vengeance, but rather authorized direct exercise of that vengeance. The
Texas statute thus was the truest example of a modem law that achieved
institutionalization by permission. Until 1974, when it was repealed, the
Texas statute provided:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by the husband upon one
taken in the act of adultery with the wife, provided the killing take
place before the parties to the act have separated. Such circumstance
cannot justify a homicide where it appears that there has been, on the
part of the 2husband,
any connivance in or assent to the adulterous
55
connection.
Initially, the statute was given a broad, liberal interpretation, but by
the 1930s it came to be construed more strictly. The early case of Price v.
State 256 set the pattern for a liberal reading of the statutory terms. In
176 (1944)); P. CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE
127-29 (1930). "Likewise, the Divine Hadrian wrote that the murderer of a man who violated
him or his own should be discharged." DIG. 48.8.1.4. However, at times the husband was
TION TO EARLY ROMAN LAW

expected to kill the wife or daughter as well. 2-C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN

WORLD § 923, at 478 (1937); DIG. 48.5.39.8 (Pap.).
These Roman laws were the probable roots of the French C. PEN. art. 324 (Dalloz) (repealed 1975): "[I]n cases of adultery,... the murder of one's spouse as well as the accessory, at
the very moment of discovery in the very act in the matrimonial home, is excusable."
253. See Roberts, The Unwritten Law, 10 Ky. L.J. 45 (1922).
254. TEX. PENAL CODE arts. 561-562 (1857); art. 567 (1879); art. 672 (1895); art. 1102
(1911); art. 1220 (Vernon 1925); repealed, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399, § 3(a).
255.

TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1220 (Vernon 1925).

256.

18 Tex. App. 474 (1885). The court adopted a liberal Delaware decision on provoca-
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Price, the court interpreted "taken in the act" to mean not the very act,
but circumstances that reasonably suggested to the husband that adultery
had occurred or was about to occur; the phrase "before they have separated" was taken to mean while the wife and her paramour were still in
257
each other's company.
The Texas statute justified homicide if the husband discovered the
parties copulating,2 5 8 wherever that was, 259 if he acted on reasonable appearances. 260 Despite the Texas courts' willingness to construe the justifiable homicide statute broadly, there were nonetheless limitations on its

breadth. The actual adultery must have been a surprise to the hus262
band, 26 1 the killing must have been motivated by the present adultery,
and there must have been some indecency between the paramour and the
wife. 263 Although an early case established that the statute permitted the
husband to kill his wife as well as her paramour, 264 Texas courts criticized this interpretation and reversed it the following decade. 2 65 Furthermore, Texas judges refused to extend the statute to permit a wife to kill
266
her husband's paramour.
Under the Texas statute, the injury to the paramour was only justifi-

tion, State v. Pratt, 1 Del. Crim. (1 Houst.) 249 (1867), save that what was provocation for
manslaughter in Delaware justified homicide in Texas.
257. Price, 18 Tex. App. at 479-84; accord Shaw v. State, 510 S.W.2d 926, 930-31 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974); Cox v. State, 100 Tex. Crim. 402, 403-04, 273 S.W. 580, 581 (1925); Williams v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 480, 484-85, 165 S.W. 583, 585-87 (1914).
258. E.g., Dewberry v. State, 74 S.W. 307, 308-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903).
259. Giles v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 561, 564, 67 S.W. 411, 412 (1902). Note that this is
broader than Alfred's statute. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
260. "[I]f the circumstances were such as to cause appellant reasonably to believe from his
standpoint that his wife and the deceased... were about to copulate, [then] he would be
justified in acting on such appearances." Gregory v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 73, 78, 94 S.W.
1041, 1043 (1906); accord Shaw v. State, 510 S.W.2d 926, 930-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
261. Burton v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 234, 239, 86 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1935) (husband had
twice before found his wife and deceased in a compromising position; murder); Zimmerman v.
State, 121 Tex. Crim. 468, 473-74, 51 S.W.2d 327, 329 (1932) (wife was living in adultery with
deceased; husband planted dynamite in deceased's stove; murder).
262. Morrisson v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 519, 521, 47 S.W. 369, 370 (1898); Massie v. State,
30 Tex. App. 64, 69-70, 16 S.W. 770, 772-73 (1891).
263. McFarland v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 516, 520-21, 196 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1946) (flirting
not enough); Ryan v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. 464, 470, 55 S.W.2d 829, 832 (1932) (had arm
around wife, saw husband, fled, shot in back; not enough); Holman v. State, 92 Te;. Crim. 364,
367, 243 S.W. 1093, 1095 (1922) (sitting in lap, going into hotel together not enough).
264. Cook v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 116, 120, 180 S.W. 254, 256 (1915).
265. Billings v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 338, 343-44, 277 S.W. 687, 689 (1925); accordMorris v. State, 442 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Steadham v. State, 119 Tex. Crim.
475, 476, 43 S.W.2d 944, 945 (1931); Jimenez v. State, 103 Tex. Crim. 163, 167, 280 S.W. 829,
832 (1925); see also Note, Is Husband'sAct in Killing Wife Taken in Act ofAdultery Justifiable
Homicide in Texas?, 2 TEX. L. REv. 111, 114 (1923); Recent Case, 4 TEX. L. REv. 383 (1926)
(killing of wife taken in adultery not justified).
266. Barr v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 178, 188, 172 S.W.2d 322, 325 (1943); Reed v. State,
123 Tex. Crim. 348, 351-52, 59 S.W.2d 122, 123-24 (1933).
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able when inflicted with the intent to kill. This rule was highlighted by
the decision in Sensobaugh v. State,267 when the court affirmed the appel-

lant's conviction for aggravated assault. Sensobaugh had found the paramour with his wife under circumstances that justified the conclusion
that they were about to engage in intercourse. Sensobaugh drew a gun,
but stated that he did not want to kill the paramour and castrated him
instead.
The appellant contended that he was immune under the statute. The
court held that:
Under the facts, the statute might have justified the appellant had
he killed the injured party. He chose, however, not to kill him, but to
maim him, or to inflict serious bodily injury upon him without the
intent to kill. We find no warrant for extending the statute so as to
give immunity for such conduct.... Even under our statute, the paramour does not forfeit his privilege of escape, nor does he wholly forfeit his right to defend his life. Doubtless, if serious bodily injury had
been inflicted by the appellant in an attempt to kill the injured party,
his immunity would be secure under the statute, but the record negatives such an intent, and makes it plain that
268 his intent was not to kill,
but to torture and maim the paramour.

Although the husband was required to act with intent to kill, he did
not have to kill the paramour in the heat of passion; he was permitted to
kill in cold blood. 26 9 Thus, with legislative policy allowing the husband
to lawfully execute the paramour, 270 a husband so wronged could have

appointed himself the lawful executioner of one he found in bed with his
wife.
(2) Georgia
Until 1977, Georgia also permitted a husband or father to kill the
paramour of his spouse or child under limited circumstances. 27 1 This rule
267. 92 Tex. Crim. 417, 244 S.W. 379 (1922).
268. Id. at 417-18, 244 S.W. at 379 (citation omitted).
269. Stumberg, Defense of Person and Property under Texas Criminal Law, 21 TEX. L.
REv. 17, 17-19 (1942) ("[IThe judicial decisions give the paramour a sporting chance, since if
he counter-attacks and kills the husband in order to escape death or bodily injury at the hand
of the husband his offense is . . . murder without malice, which is the Texas equivalent of
voluntary manslaughter.").
270. MODEL PENAL CODE, comments at 208-09 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). But the adulterous interloper need not have expected execution, at least by 1971. Great Am. Reserve Ins.
v. Sumner, 464 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) ("[P]articipation in an adulterous affair
does not naturally lead to a violent and fatal ending. [The] Penal Code provi[sion] that homicide is justifiable when committed by the husband ... does not necessarily mean that every
adulterer is bound to anticipate death as the inevitable result of his act." Plaintiff succeeded in
collecting on her husband's accidental death policy, after he was killed by another who found
him in adultery with his wife.). ContraMcCrary v. N.Y. Life Ins., 84 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir.
1936); Szymanska v. Equitable Life Ins., 37 Del. (7 Harr.) 272, 278, 183 A. 309, 313 (1936).
271. This interpretation of the statute was abrogated in 1977:
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was a creature
of judicial interpretation 272 of a general justifiable homi273

cide statute.
The Georgia courts interpreted the justifiable homicide law as a
class of self-defense, while the Texas statute was in effect a law allowing

revenge. The most significant distinction between the Georgia and Texas
rules was that the killing under the Georgia rule was defensive in nature
and had to be necessary to prevent and defend against the adultery. A
killing after the adultery was vengeance, and therefore was murder or

manslaughter depending on whether it was committed in the sudden heat

of passion. 274 The defensive nature of the justification allowed killing to
In this day of no-fault, on-demand divorce, when adultery is merely a misdemeanor, and when there is a debate raging in the country about whether capital
punishment even for the most heinous crime is proper, any idea that a spouse is ever
justified in taking the life of another-adulterous spouse or illicit lover-to prevent
adultery is uncivilized. This is murder; and henceforth, nothing more appearing, an
instruction on justifiable homicide may not be given.
Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171, 172, 231 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1977) (citations omitted).
272. The leading Georgia Supreme Court justices to so construe the statute were Joseph
Henry Lumpkin (1799-1867) in Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723 (1860); his father's great-grandson,
Samuel Lumpkin (1848-1903), in Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 17 S.E. 990 (1893); and his
own grandson, John Henry Lumpkin 11 (1856-1916), in Gossett v. State, 123 Ga. 431, 51 S.E.
395 (1905). A HISTORY OF THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT 48, 168, 192 (J. Harris ed. 1948).
273. GA. PENAL CODE § 75 (1910); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1016 (1933); id. § 21-901(f)
(1972). The rule owed its origins to the antebellum case of Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 728-29
(1860) (Lumpkin, J.), in which the court held that the statute was intended
to clothe the juries in criminal cases, in which they are made the judges of the law as
well as the facts, with large discretionary powers over this class of offenses; and leave
it with them to find whether the particular instance stands on the same footing of
reason and justice as the cases of justifiable homicide specified in the code[.] Has an
American jury ever convicted a husband or father of murder or manslaughter, for
killing the seducer of his wife or daughter? And with this exceedingly broad and
comprehensive enactment on our statute book, is it just to juries to brand them with
perjury for rendering such verdicts in this State? Is it not their right to determine
whether, in reason or justice, it is not as justifiable in the sight of Heaven and earth,
to slay the murderer of the peace and respectability of a family, as one who forcibly
attacks habitation and property? What is the annihilation of houses or chattels by
fire and faggot, compared with the destruction of female innocence; robbing woman
of that priceless jewel, which leaves her a blasted ruin, with the mournful motto
inscribed upon its frontals, thy glory is departed?' Our sacked habitations may be
rebuilt, but who shall repair this moral desolation? How many has it sent suddenly,
with unbearable sorrow, to their graves?
In what has society a deeper concern than in the protection of female purity,
and the marriage relation? The wife cannot surrender herself to another. It is treason against the conjugal rights. Dirty dollars will not compensate for a breach of the
nuptial vow. And if the wife is too weak to save herself, is it not the privilege of the
jury to say whether the strong arm of the husband may not interpose, to shield and
defend her from pollution?
274. E.g., Cloud v. State, 81 Ga. 444, 451, 7 S.E. 641, 642 (1888):
Speaking for myself, I think that gunpowder and ball are great preservers of human
virtue; and if I were on a jury, I do not hesitate to say that I would acquit a man who
would kill another under such circumstances. But the law is ... that the killing must
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stop an adulterous relationship of which the husband or father was
275
aware if it seemed to the husband or father to be the only way to do so.
In contrast, under the Texas statute a husband was only permitted to act
if he was surprised with a present adultery. However, the Georgia rule
'276 It
did allow the killing of the paramour if he was "taken in the act.
277
278
extended to the protection of daughters and fiancees,
although evidence of the woman's chastity was admissible on the question of whether
it was necessary to kill to protect it,279 which was a question for the
jury.

28 0

In contrast to the situation in Texas, in Georgia the wife could kill
her husband's paramour, 281 but just as in Texas, the spouse was not perbe to prevent the adultery, and it is only in such case that the killing would be
justified.
This quote is from the regional reporter; the first sentence is not in the official report. See also
Ellison v. State, 137 Ga. 193, 73 S.E. 255 (1911) (syllabus by the Court); O'Shields v. State,
125 Ga. 310, 314-15, 54 S.E. 120, 121-22 (1906); Baker v. State, 111 Ga. 141, 142, 36 S.E. 607,
608 (1900); Farmer v. State, 91 Ga. 720, 727-28, 18 S.E. 987, 990 (1894); Mays v. State, 88 Ga.
399, 402, 14 S.E. 560, 561 (1891); Stewart v. State, 66 Ga. 90, 100 (1880) (Jackson, C.J.,
concurring); Hill v. State, 64 Ga. 453, 469 (1880).
275. Miller v. State, 9 Ga. App. 599, 599-600, 71 S.E. 1021, 1021 (1911) (involuntary
manslaughter conviction overturned after trial court failed to instruct jury that a father had a
right to protect his daughter from a continuing adulterous relationship, by homicide if necessary); see Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215, 219, 184 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1971) ("The gist of [Miller] is
that where a continuing adulterous affair exists, as opposed to mere past acts of misconduct, if
a jury believes the killing was done to prevent future misconduct, an acquittal is authorized.");
Scroggs v. State, 94 Ga. App. 28, 30, 93 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1956) ("[I]n order to justify such a
killing it is not necessary that the act be in progress, or that it is to be committed then and
there. It is enough if it be apparent that the killing is necessary to prevent a planned act of
sexual intercourse."). But if defendant killed the paramour "under a violent sudden impulse of
passion engendered by the circumstances and conditions," the jury could have convicted the
husband of voluntary manslaughter. Todd v. State, 75 Ga. App. 711, 716-17, 44 S.E.2d 275,
280 (1947); accord Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399, 403, 49 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1948).
276. Coart v. State, 156 Ga. 536, 556, 119 S.E. 723, 733 (1923) ("justified more as a concession to that righteous and justifiable indignation which is a natural concomitant of those
holy feelings upon which love of home and the protection of its purity must of necessity rest");
Richardson v. State, 70 Ga. 825, 830-31 (1883) (adopting the rationale of Jackson's concurrence in Stewart v. State, 66 Ga. 90 (1880)); Lassiter v. State, 61 Ga. App. 203, 208, 6 S.E.2d
102, 104, (1939) ("[T]here is no distinction which makes the killing of an adulterer by a husband while engaged in the act any different from a killing which takes place as the guilty
adulterer rises and attempts to flee."); Gibson v. State, 44 Ga. App. 264, 161 S.E. 158 (1931);
see also Miller v. State, 63 S.E. 71, 573 (Ga. 1909) ("[The human cur who has invaded the
domestic fold and who is likely to invade it further, may be killed, even though the injured
person does not catch him in the very act.") (dictum in a case about animals).
277. Gossett v. State, 123 Ga. 431, 434, 51 S.E. 394, 395 (1905); Miller v. State, 9 Ga.
App. 599, 601-02, 71 S.E. 1021, 1021-22 (1911).
278. Futch v. State, 90 Ga. 472, 479-80, 16 S.E. 102, 104 (1892).
279. Gossett v. State, 123 Ga. 431, 437-40, 51 S.E. 394, 396-97 (1905).
280. Cloud v. State, 81 Ga. 444, 450, 7 S.E. 641, 641 (1888); Rossi v. State, 7 Ga. App.
732, 737, 68 S.E. 56, 59 (1910).
281. Daniels v. State, 162 Ga. 366, 369, 133 S.E. 866, 869 (1926) ("Under the homely
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mitted to kill the other spouse. 28 2 Another difference between the Georgia and Texas justifiable homicide rules was that, in Georgia, the
paramour was not given the so-called "sporting chance." "[A] man surprised by the husband immediately after an actual, or immediately before
an intended adulterous connection, can lawfully defend himself against
the husband's violence by flight only, or at least by means short of
deadly. 2 8 3 However, the paramour in Georgia justifiably could have
defended himself with deadly force in the limited circumstance when the
husband, knowing of the adultery, hoped to avail himself of the justifi-

so as to "catch him
able homicide law by lying in wait for the paramour
28 4

in the act" to become his legal executioner.
In the published appellate decisions of the Georgia courts, judges
typically were careful to point out that the rule was "not an exposition of

any 'unwritten law,' but [was] a well-defined principle of the law reduced

to writing. 28 5 Yet the Georgia rule did in fact allow the killing of an
adulterer "taken in the act," and, thus, like the Texas statute, institutionalized the revenge of the cuckold by permitting it, rather than by coopting it.
(3) Other American Jurisdictions
At one time, two other American jurisdictions, New Mexico and
Utah, had statutes justifying the killing by a husband of his wife's paramour if he found them together in adultery.
New Mexico's statute provided the unwritten law as a defense if the
interloper had been caught "in the act." 286 This language was intermaxim that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, the... principles are applicable
in a proper case where the wife is the slayer."); accord Scroggs v. State, 94 Ga. App. 28, 93
S.E.2d 583 (1956). This rule also extended to common-law wives. Drewry v. State, 208 Ga.
239, 244, 65 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1951).
282. Henderson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 490, 491, 221 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1975).
283. Drysdale v. State, 83 Ga. 744, 746, 10 S.E. 358, 358 (1889); see supra note 269.
284. Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 735, 17 S.E. 990, 992 (1893) ("[The law never makes
justifiable a homicide committed in the spirit of revenge, and for the purpose of revenge
only.").
285. Coart v. State, 156 Ga. 536, 555, 119 S.E. 723, 732 (1923); see Miller v. State. 9 Ga.
App. 599, 601, 71 S.E. 1021, 1022 (1911) ("There is no 'unwritten law' in this State in criminal
cases.").
286. The statute read:
Upon a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, in addition to other defenses which
may be offered, it may be shown as a complete defense that the homicide resulted
from the person's use of deadly force upon another who was at the time of the homicide in the act of having sexual intercourse with the accused's wife. In order for this
defense to be available to the accused, the accused and his wife must have been living
together as husband and wife at the time of the homicide.
N.M. COMP. LAWS § 1076 (1897); N.M. PENAL CODE § 1468 (1915); N.M. STAT ANN.
§ 40A-2-1 (1972), 1636 N.M. Laws ch. 303, §§ 2-4; repealed, 1973 N.M. Laws ch. 241, § 6.
The statute was repealed when New Mexico was confronted with ratification of the Equal
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preted in the lone reported case more narrowly than the similar language
in the Texas statute. In State v. Greenlee,2 87 the court said that
[t]he purpose of the law is not vindictive. It is humane. It recognizes
the ungovernable passion which possesses a man when immediately
confronted with his wife's dishonor. It merely says the man who takes
life under those circumstances is not to be punished; not because he
has performed2 88
a meritorious deed; but because he has acted naturally
and humanly.
The strict language of the statute did not require heat of passion,
however, and so, like the Texas statute, it allowed a husband to execute
the paramour in cold blood. Thus the husband's vengeance, not otherwise effectively co-opted, was permitted by the state.
Utah also had an unwritten law statute. 289 In the scant case law,
courts interpreted the Utah statute to cover situations similar to those
covered by the Texas or New Mexico laws, but also to require a sudden
heat of passion.290 The effect of the statute was to transform what would
have been manslaughter into justifiable homicide.
C. The "Unwritten" Part of the "Unwritten Law": Jury Verdicts
Juries sometimes refuse to convict defendants charged with behavior
they do not believe should be criminal. 291 Although the judge can instruct the jury with law that, if followed, would require conviction, the
jury may disregard it and apply the law as it sees fit. Juries have the
power to do this, have been doing so for centuries, and continue to do so.
The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution 292 ensures
the jury the last word in criminal cases, because once the cuckold has
been acquitted, he cannot be retried by a prosecutor hoping to find a less
sympathetic jury.
Juries have shown a propensity to acquit husbands charged with the
murder or manslaughter of a marital interloper. All "normal" sources of
Rights Amendment. Daniels, The Impact of the ERA on the New Mexico Criminal Code, 3
N.M.L. REv. 107, 107-09 (1973).
287. 33 N.M. 449, 269 P. 331 (1928).
288. Id. at 455, 269 P. at 333.
289. "Homicide is also justifiable... [w]hen committed in a sudden heat of passion caused
by the attempt of the deceased to commit a rape upon or to defile the wife, daughter, sister,
mother or other female dependent of the accused, or when the defilement has actually been
committed." UTAH COMp. LAWS § 1925 (1876); UTAH COMp. LAWS § 4461(3) (1888); UTAH
REV. STAT. § 4168 (1898); UTAH COMp. LAWS § 8032(4) (1917); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3010 (1953); repealed, 1973 Utah Laws, ch. 196, § 76-10-1401.
290. State v. Besares, 75 Utah 141, 144, 283 P. 738, 738-39 (1929); State v. Williams, 49
Utah 320, 328, 163 P. 1104, 1107 (1917) (dictum); State v. Botha, 27 Utah 289, 300-03, 75 P.
731, 736-37 (1904); Territory v. Halliday, 5 Utah 467, 473-74, 17 P. 118, 122 (1888).
291. See generally Roberts, supra note 253; Note, supra note 242.
292. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
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law, that is, positive law emanating from the state, direct a conviction,
yet the repeated acquittals suggest another law, and this is the "unwritten law." Its source is the lay community from which the jurors are
drawn, and it reflects the popular will. 293 Although courts often vehemently denounce it for virtually bypassing the judicial system, 294 until
recently, they seemed to expect it.295 Certainly, in some parts of the

country, the local bar expected

it.296

The unwritten law has been criticized because it breeds disrespect
for the written law.2 97 It is also said to damage legal doctrine because the
293.

See Frank, Lawlessness, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 277-79

(1937).
294. See, eg., People v. Young, 70 Cal. App. 2d 28, 36, 160 P.2d 132, 136 (1945); Jones v.
People, 23 Colo. 276, 283, 47 P. 275, 277 (1896); Stean v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 413, 420,
102 S.W.2d 363, 367 (1937); Wehenkel v. State, 116 Neb. 493, 495, 218 N.W. 137, 138 (1928).
Official judicial hostility towards the "unwritten law" provokes interesting questions in a land
where the people are theoretically the ultimate sovereign. See generally H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW chs. I-IX (1961); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945).
295. McCrary v. N.Y. Life Ins., 84 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1936) ("[I]njury at the hand of
an incensed husband who, in his own home, finds one in adultery with his wife... is reasonably foreseeable."); Szymanska v. Equitable Life Ins., 37 Del. (7 Harr.) 272, 278, 183 A. 309,
313 (1936) ("[O]ne, who in the pursuit of his lust, makes improper advances to the wife.., of
another, in her own home, creates voluntarily a situation fraught with danger to himself in that
discovery by and violence at the hands of the outraged husband are reasonably foreseeable, and
such as naturally and probably will result."). These acts might not be thought so foreseeable if
they usually resulted in murder convictions. It seems almost as if the courts think the killing is
proper.
296. The most well-documented example is Oklahoma. The reported Oklahoma cases renouncing the unwritten law exceed all those from the rest of the country. "The so-called
unwritten law, . . . 'the right to avenge a wrong done a female member of one's family by
killing the wrongdoer' does not exist in this jurisdiction." January v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 166,
175, 181 P. 514, 517 (1919); see Neece v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 60, 67, 104 P.2d 568, 571-72
(1940) ("Under the facts and the law, a judgment and sentence of murder would be upheld in
this case.... [Tihe jury was lenient."); Alexander v. State, 66 Okla. Crim. 219, 226, 90 P.2d
949, 953 (1939); Merrick v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 88, 93-94, 34 P.2d 281, 283 (1934); Kell v.
State, 53 Okla. Crim. 45, 53, 6 P.2d 836, 839 (1931) ("[Ihe defendant should have been
convicted of murder instead of manslaughter, and the fact that he was only convicted of manslaughter ...is probably due to the illicit relations which existed between deceased and defendant's wife, which the jury considered as mitigation of the offense."); Posey v. State, 50
Okla. Crim. 129, 296 P. 527 (1931); Pickett v. State, 40 Okla. Crim. 289, 296, 268 P. 732, 734
(1928). Clearly, Oklahoma lawyers would not have repeatedly appealed on this ground without some reason for believing it existed. Finally, the problem was last addressed in Hamilton
v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 262, 244 P.2d 328 (1952), which suggested a rebuttable presumption
of temporary insanity:
The unwritten law.., does not exist in Oklahoma, but we can perceive where a
man of good moral character ....highly respected in his community, having regard
for his duties as a husband and the virtue of women, upon learning of the immorality
of his wife, might be shocked, or such knowledge might prey upon his mind and
cause temporary insanity. In fact, it would appear that such would be the most likely
consequence of obtaining such information.
Id. at 269, 244 P.2d at 335.
297. The theory of Roberts, supra note 253.
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insanity defense is often successfully used--or abused-to present the
circumstances of the adultery to the jury. 298 However, the written law
failed to institutionalize the cuckold's vengeance through co-optation.
Thus, by approving self-help, the "unwritten law" emerged to institutionalize it through permission.
Conclusion
Adultery was the only great wrong in primitive society that, save for
a few short periods, remained a private wrong as other anti-social behavior became criminalized. For other serious wrongs, the state co-opted
the victim's vengeance by acting it out, as in the Roman law of theft.
However, because the wrong remained either private or a matter for religious authorities, the state could not co-opt the rage of the marital interloper's victim. Instead, the state institutionalized the cuckold's vengeance by permitting its actual exercise. To protect its monopoly of violence, the state would logically be forced to punish the husband who
takes the law into his own hands. Yet sometimes, as in Texas, it would
not, and other times, inhibited by juries, it could not do so.
The fundamental problem with the law concerning adultery has
been that the act of adultery is not thought to merit death, while the
discovering cuckold is thought entitled to exact it. Whether this paradox
derives from the social importance of the marital relationship, from the
dominance of the male in our culture, or from a combination of these and
other factors, is a question beyond the realm of legal theory. It is clear,
however, that adultery presents a gap in the theory of co-optation, which
otherwise accounts for much of the law's response to anti-social behavior. This Note, by presenting the parallel theory of state permission of
private vengeance, suggests a solution to this problem and a way to understand more fully the development of our law.
Jeremy D. Weinstein*

298.
*

The thesis of Note, supra note 242.
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